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THE EFFECTS OF THE THIRD REFORM ACT ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND
ORGANIZATION IN INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN, 1886-1906

An Abstract of the Thesis By
Michael S. Vernon

The Third Reform Act doubled the size of the British electorate by extending the
urban franchise reform of 1867 into the counties. The Act also called for a redistribution
of seats in Parliament which eliminated most multi-member constituencies and replace
them with single-member constituencies. These reforms changed the political landscape
resulting in a more democratic electorate. The twenty years following the Third Reform
Act are characterized by a Conservative ascendancy, which saw Conservatives take power
and control British politics for the next generation. This Conservative ascendancy was
possible because of the increased importance of public opinion in the electoral calculus of
British politics. The Conservative party effectively appealed to new voters and formed a
broad coalition around maintaining the status-quo, while the Liberal party failed to build a
comparable coalition and instead advocated for social reforms that were unpopular outside
of faddist pressure groups. The Liberal party split over Gladstone’s support of Irish Home
Rule enabled the Conservative party to take power following the 1886 general election and
remain the dominant party until 1906.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Third Reform Act which necessitated a general election in 1885 had a
significant impact on the course of British politics in the late Victorian period. The size of
the electorate was more than doubled, and parliamentary representation was redistributed
with the creation of single-member constituencies, ushering in a more democratic
political process. The two general elections following the Third Reform Act resulted in
the Liberal party losing seats in 1885 and falling out of power in 1886. Conservatives
ascended to control of parliament following the 1886 general election and dominated
British politics for the following generation.
This thesis argues that the Conservative ascendancy was possible due to the more
democratic nature of the electorate after the Third Reform Act. The increased political
organization and activity amongst all classes greatly enhanced the role of public opinion
in electoral politics. This is seen in the 1885 general election, the first following the
passage of the Third Reform Act. In this election, the Liberal party lost seats compared to
the 1880 election. This loss of seats was due to the Liberal party’s failure to effectively
organize their base and their support of unpopular social reform campaigns. Although the
Liberal party lost seats in 1885, they maintained their position as the governing party as
Irish Nationalists aligned with the Liberals because of their support of Irish Home Rule.
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However, Irish Home Rule split the Liberal party in 1886 and swept them out of power.
While the Irish Home Rule crisis played a major role in the electoral defeat for the
Liberal party, it was also indicative of their inability to appeal to the ideals of the
electorate. The Conservative party, in large part, did not suffer from this problem. Their
party organizations successfully appealed to the ideals of several classes of voters, such
as national identity among the working-class, and defense of property among the middleclass, to bolster Conservative electoral support. It was this organizational strength of the
Conservative party, and the collapse of the Liberal party that created the Conservative
ascendancy of 1886-1906.
The Third Reform Act brought the total British electorate to over five and a half
million voters, while also redistributing seats in Parliament. Although commonly referred
to as a single reform, the Third Reform Act is two distinct reforms which combined to
alter the British political system. The Representation of the People Act, 1884 granted an
extension of household suffrage into all counties of Britain.1 That act also eliminated the
multiple voter eligibilities for a single individual within a single district.2 While the
largest effect of the Representation of the People Act, 1884 was felt in the counties of
Britain, the 1880s were not without significant change for the boroughs as well. The other
half of the Third Reform Act, officially known as the Redistribution of Seats Act 1885,
achieved that change by redistributing parliamentary seats and establishing the modern
system of single-member constituencies.3

1

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. House of Commons. The Representation of the People
Act, 1884, Oxford University, 1.
2
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. House of Commons. The Representation of the People
Act, 1884, Oxford University, 2.
3
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. House of Commons. The Redistribution of Seats Act
1885, Archive, 1.
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The division of previously multi-member constituencies into single-member
constituencies allowed for more concise electoral battles between Liberals and
Conservatives, as well as inter-party conflicts. The increased electorate and redistributed
parliamentary seats of the Third Reform Act bolstered political activity and organization
across all classes, and saw public opinion play a greatly enhanced role in electoral
politics in the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, British politics became increasingly
democratic as Parliament introduced a wave of reforms increasing the size of the
electorate and reconfiguring the distribution of parliamentary seats. The Third Reform
Act of 1884-5 was the most significant of these nineteenth century reforms, bringing the
total electorate to five and a half million voters, and establishing the single member
constituency. The largest increase in electoral numbers came from the counties, which
received the same voter qualifications as burghs received in the Second Reform Act of
1867. The Third Reform Act had a significant impact on burghs as well, as the creation of
single member districts allowed for a more concise electoral fight between Liberals and
Conservatives. This thesis argues that the Third Reform Act bolstered political
organization and activity amongst all classes, creating a government that saw following
public opinion as vital to remaining electorally relevant.
Before any examination of the effects of the Third Reform Act can be properly
undertaken, it is prudent to first examine the state of British politics before the reforms in
question. Prior to the Third Reform Act, the nineteenth century saw two major
parliamentary reforms, in 1832 and 1867. The First Reform Act came about because the
nineteenth century saw the importance of agriculture wane, and the traditional method of
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electing the Commons was no longer practical, as the general interests of Britain were no
longer being represented. As Britain’s economic interests shifted towards the industrial
urban centers it became apparent that parliament as then constructed offered a severely
disproportionate representation of the population.4
According to Jonathan Parry, the Great Reform Act became a natural issue for the
Whigs to support because of their hostility to Tory exclusiveness, and the extravagance
and corruption of Tory ministers.5 Parry also makes the argument that the Whigs made
prototypical appeals to public opinion in their campaign for the Reform Act, stating:
The early nineteenth century saw a sea-change in the relationship between
whiggery and public opinion. On the one hand, many small borough patrons
defected to government during the war. On the other, the unpopularity of
government, especially after 1806 transformed whig fortunes…The whigs’
calls for low taxation, opposition to repressive legislation, and criticism of the
Regent’s extravagance and influence gave them a much higher profile and
popularity in the country…Nothing distinguished whigs from tories more
than the former’s willingness to rouse popular agitation.6
According to Parry, the Whigs supported the Reform Act because of their growing
popularity in the country and because of postwar discontent.7 Although there was initial
Tory opposition to the notion of parliamentary reform, long-held anxiety over the French
Revolution ultimately led to pressure both from above and below to reform the
parliamentary system.8 According to Toke S. Aidt and Raphael Franck, the support
received by Whigs and Radicals in the 1831 general election, the last before the Great
Reform and generally viewed as a referendum on the Reform Bill, came from voters in
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Stephen J Lee, Aspects of British Political History 1815-1914 (London: Routledge, 1994), 54.
Jonathan Parry, The Rise and the Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993), 74.
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Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 74-6.
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Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 76.
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constituencies hit particularly hard by the 1831 Swing Riots.9 This pressure, however,
should not be interpreted as a call for democracy. Aidt and Franck make this argument in
claiming that the riots were not concentrated in areas with a strong underlying support for
reform, and that the most likely cause of the riots was instead the harsh socio-economic
deprivation in rural areas in general and the poor harvests of 1828-29 in general, as
evidenced by the frequency with which threshing machines were destroyed as a protest
against the deteriorated conditions for agricultural laborers.10 Thus, rather than being an
outright movement towards democracy, the reforms were aimed at bringing new groups
into the existing arena of power instead of handing power over to them directly.11 As
such, the 1832 Reform Act was a defensive measure to placate extra parliamentary
forces.12 To those already in power, the best method of preserving their power without
creating unrest by ignoring calls for reform was to grant the franchise to the middle
classes, which represented the industrial ownership.13 This reform, which was given royal
assent in June 1832 expanded the franchise to include middle class men, but did not
change the number of seats in the House of Commons, with only 143 of 658 seats being
redistributed.14
Despite the unprecedented extent of the 1832 Reform Act, it was still relatively
limited in impact on a grand scale, with less than fifteen percent of British men being
eligible to vote and seats in the Commons still unequally distributed.15 Thomas Ertman

Toke S. Aidt and Raphael Franck, “Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the
Great Reform Act of 1832,” Econometrica 83, no. 2 (2015): 508.
10
Aidt and Franck, “Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution,” 513-4.
11
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 54.
12
Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 73.
13
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 56.
14
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 58.
15
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 59.
9
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however gives a generally favorable review of the Great Reform Act, arguing that it
leaves three long-term consequences which, he argues, continue to resonate more than a
century later.16 The first of those consequences was the arrival of truly national,
participatory politics. According to Ertman and John Phillips, the agitation for reform
around the First Reform Act united ordinary people across Britain in political debates and
lobbying.17 The second consequence was the consolidation of a two-party system based
around religious preference, with Tories/Conservatives primarily consisting of Anglicans
and Whigs/Liberals the preferred party of Dissenters. The elimination of nomination
boroughs meant that governments could no longer depend on them to return majorities to
Parliament, and therefore necessitated the growth of political party organizations to
ensure support among the constituencies.18 Finally, Ertman argues that the relatively
exclusive nature of the First Reform Act produced lasting consequences for British
politics as it sowed the seeds of future parliamentary reforms over the course of the
following century:
[The] act contained within it the seed of the future reforms of 1867, 18841885, and 1918 because it still excluded the great majority of the adult
population from the vote. Furthermore, the use of a uniform (and arbitrary)
property value of £10 as the main electoral qualification in the boroughs in
the face of great variations in the level of rents across the country meant that
men who were well down the social scale but lived in expensive cities such
as London obtained the vote whereas those similarly situated but living
elsewhere did not (Hilton, 2006, p. 434). At the same time, the act provided a
model for overcoming such inherent tensions and contradictions through a
gradual lowering of electoral qualifications that, because they were clearly
the result of political deals embodied in the various reform acts, no longer
benefited from the legitimacy hallowed by time that the 40 shilling freehold
and the diverse borough franchises had enjoyed prior to 1832.19
Thomas Ertman, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” Comparative Political
Studies 43, no. 8-9 (2010): 1009.
17
Ertman, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” 1009.
18
Ertman, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” 1010.
19
Ertman, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” 1010.
16
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Parry takes a more critical stance of the First Reform Act, arguing that it did not
drastically alter the social composition of parliament, with Members of Parliament still
coming mostly from the wealthy, industrial, and gentrified families of Britain.20 He went
on to argue that the minor changes in parliamentary composition caused two important
problems: the increased political activity of MPs threatened government control of the
timetable for legislation, and the Radical MPs who had entered Parliament following the
Reform Act pushed consistently for reforms that the government was not ready to grant.21
Martin Pugh gives a similarly critical appraisal of the 1832 Reform Act, characterizing
the changes brought by it as “remarkably slight.”22 Pugh claims that while the size of the
electorate was doubled, to just over 700,000, that still only amounted to twenty percent of
British adult men, and that the £10 householder qualification had effectively enfranchised
the middle classes and largely excluded workingmen.23 Of the overall significance of the
First Reform Act, Pugh stated:
While reform gave the middle-class formal recognition it did not allow them
extra power, at least in the short term. The social composition of the post1832 parliaments proved to be very similar to those of the earlier period.
Most MPs continued to be drawn from landed and titles families in spite of
the reduction in the number of small patronage boroughs. In short, 1832
failed to bring about a bourgeois revolution. On the other hand, those Whigs
who claimed who claimed that the Great Reform Act represented a final
solution of the reform question were over-optimistic. Indeed, no further
reform took place until 1867, but once the old system had been altered there
could be no fundamental objection to further change.24

20

Parry, Liberal Government, 99.
Parry, Liberal Government, 102-3.
22
Martin Pugh, Britain Since 1789: Concise History (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1999), 49.
23
Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 49.
24
Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 50.
21
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Thus, while the Great Reform Act did double the size of the electorate, this increase in
size only encompassed between fifteen and twenty percent of British men, mostly of
whom came from middle class families. Ultimately, the reform did not drastically alter
the composition or operation of Parliament but did create national politics and set the
stage for future parliamentary reforms.
However, it was not until the 1860s that a new call for reform began to gain
momentum in parliament. In the years between 1832 and 1867 democracy was a
bogeyman, a threat to be held up as a sign of how things could go wrong.25 However, by
the mid-1860s there was little disagreement in Parliament that reform was necessary and
that it needed to include a significant working-class enfranchisement.26 This was the
work of William Gladstone, who argued that parliamentary reform could be used to
incorporate the working-class aristocracy into the existing political hierarchy to prevent
the risk of socialism gaining a foothold in Britain.27 Gladstone introduced a bill in 1866
which would have added only a few hundred thousand new voters; mostly shopkeepers
and artisans who were known to be mostly pro-Liberal.28 There was intense criticism of
that bill by both sides as a large part of the Liberal party wanted universal manhood
suffrage and the Conservative party desired a more selective electorate.29 Disagreement
over the terms of the bill ultimately led to John Russell and Gladstone’s resignation and a
minority Conservative government in which Benjamin Disraeli proposed a bill more
progressive than the initial bill proposed by Gladstone.30 Jon Lawrence calls this bill a

25

Hugh Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy: Britain 1832-1918 (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 102.
Robert Saunders, Democracy and the Vote in British Politics 1848-1867: The Making of the Second
Reform Act (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 265.
27
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 138.
28
Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 99.
29
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 139.
30
Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 99.
26
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giant leap towards urban male democracy with the introduction of a male householder
franchise to urban Britain, which saw the electorate grow to 1.7 million voters by the
mid-1870s.31
This bill, which eventually became the Second Reform Act granted household
suffrage to men in the boroughs of Britain; an extension which Disraeli and the
Conservative party likely saw as the necessary price to pay for remaining in power.32
Under the initial bill proposed by Gladstone, the Liberal party had only offered to extend
the franchise to the middle class, whereas the Conservative bill proposed by Disraeli
extended the franchise to the urban working class in an attempt to convert them to
dependable Conservative voters.33 Whether or not this move had the intended outcome is
questionable, as the Conservative party was out of power after a general election in 1868.
Martin Pugh echoes this sentiment, arguing that the Second Reform Act did little to help
Conservatives directly, with the general election of 1868 returning a larger majority for
Liberals than they had usually enjoyed, and for a time led to many Conservatives
condemning Disraeli for his folly in attempting to outflank the radicals.34
However, the Second Reform Act did have significant impacts on the political
landscape of Britain in the two decades between the Second and Third Reform Acts.
With the expansion of the electorate among working class voters in Britain’s industrial
centers, the two major political parties became national parties rather than regional
ones.35 The Second Reform Act also had the effect of making alternating governments

31

Jon Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 43.
32
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 140-1
33
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 141.
34
Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 99.
35
Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 143.
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more frequent; a substantial change from the near generation of power that had been
enjoyed by the Liberal party between 1846 and 1867.36
Pugh takes a favorable view of the Second Reform Act, seeing three key impacts
of the reform. The first of those effects was to stimulate the organization of radical
pressure on parliamentarians in favor of further franchise reform.37 Pugh also sees
significant changes in the electoral system; both Gladstone’s introduction of the secret
ballot in in 1872 and a bill to place limits on election expenditure and penalties for
corrupt practices in 1883 made politics more open and democratic.38 Finally, Pugh claims
that the Second Reform Act led to the Third Reform Act in 1885, when the qualifications
of the 1867 Act were extended to working men in the counties and increasing the
electorate to five and a half million voters.39
According to Lawrence, the Second Reform Act brought with it an increased
sensitivity among the British people towards the persistence of disorder in public politics,
with many observers noting an increase in electoral violence at the 1868 elections.40
However, Lawrence is also sure not to simply take those observers at their word and see
1867 as a watershed for the increase of electoral violence. Instead, Lawrence sees events
after the Second Reform Act as a result of the changing nature of public opinion and how
it was expressed. He argues that:
What changed after 1867 was not so much the level of disorder, as the
political and social context in which disorder was understood. In many
boroughs non-voters were for the first time in a minority, at least among adult
males, and traditional rituals that had symbolized their inclusion in the
political system, such as public nomination at the hustings and the ritual
36

Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 144.
Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 99.
38
Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 100.
39
Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 100.
40
Lawrence, Electing Our Masters, 44.
37
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aspects of public voting, came to be seen as dangerous anachronisms which
threatened to impede the smooth absorption of the new voters into orderly
and rational electoral politics.41
Thus, the electoral violence that is sometimes associated with the 1867 Reform Act is not
necessarily a direct result of the act itself, but instead an increased sensitivity to the
violence as more people were becoming enfranchised and the old traditions of public
politics were falling by the wayside.
John Vincent, in his work studying the Second Reform Act and its effects on
Lancashire, sees significant impacts of the Second Reform Act on British politics. His
argument is that the major impact of the Second Reform Act was the changes in the
distribution of seats in Lancashire.42 According to Vincent, this redistribution altered the
number of members returned to Parliament for each party, and attributes that change
more to the changes in each constituency rather than any change in the electorate itself.43
He does however concede that the Second Reform Act brought about some significant
indirect changes in the make up the electorate in Lanchashire in terms of rural versus
urban elements. He claims that while the 1832 £10 freehold franchise worked against the
rural laborers in Lancashire, the 1867 ratepayer franchise worked in their favor,
especially at a time when the Cotton Famine had caused a reduction in the industrial
population.44 Vincent argues that this increase in the electorate at a time that
Conservatives were favored among rural laborers was part of the reason that rural

41

Lawrence, Electing Our Masters, 44-5.
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Lancashire saw in increase in the number of Conservatives returned to Parliament in the
1868 general election.45
Some historians have taken a more measured view of the Second Reform Act.
Parry examines the Second Reform Act through the lens of its four stated objectives:
male household suffrage, limiting that suffrage through a series of restrictions based on
taxation, a high occupation franchise, and the limited redistribution of seats.46 While it is
clear to Parry that the Second Reform Act achieved those goals, it is because of those
goals that he argues that the Act has had a very narrow scope of effectiveness. Like the
Reform Act of 1832, the limited nature of seat redistribution on Parliament meant that in
the following elections, there was not a significant change in its composition.47 Hugh
Cunningham reaches essentially the same conclusion as Parry, although addresses the
issue by considering the provisions of the Second Reform Act under two heads: the
extension of the franchise and the redistribution of seats in Parliament.48 On the first
account, Cunningham gives a critical assessment of the Second Reform Act, stating that
before 1867 the franchise had been extended to roughly one in five men in England and
Wales, but by 1869 that figure had only risen to around one in three.49 That meant that
nearly two-thirds of the adult male population and the entirety of the female population
was without a vote.50 The largest increase in the franchise of course came in the
boroughs, and as such led to an uneven distribution of voting power, clustered in urban
centers with agricultural laborers being left out of the political equation. For

Vincent, “The Effect of the Second Reform Act in Lancashire,” 87.
Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 213-4.
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Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 216-7.
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Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 104.
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Cunningham, it was this uneven distribution of political power that was the largest failure
of the measure to increase the size of the electorate under the Second Reform Act.51
Cunningham also had significant criticism of the Second Reform Act’s limited attempts
to redistribute seats in Parliament. Those provisions were driven by the Conservatives’
desires to consolidate their strength in the counties, and as such sought to increase the
number of county seats to the detriment of urban constituencies.52 This led to urban
constituencies of fewer than 10,000 voters losing one or both of their MPs, which
released 52 seats, 25 of which were given to newly created seats in the counties.53
Despite this effort at redistribution, several anomalies still remained, with Wiltshire and
Dorset, a constituency of 450,000 retaining 25 MPs while London had only 24 MPs for a
population of over three million.54 To sum up his thoughts on the Second Reform Act,
Cunningham concludes by saying, “The practice of politics retained many elements of
the world before 1867 – or before 1832.55
The third piece of the trio of major parliamentary reforms of the nineteenth
century was the Third Reform Act of 1884-5. While often referred to as a singular entity,
the Third Reform Act consists of two major pieces of legislation: The Representation of
the People Act of 1884 and the Redistribution Act of 1885. These two acts were a
response to the inequality in the electoral system remaining after the 1832 and 1867
reforms.56 In the years following the Second Reform Act in 1867, the Liberal party
maintained hegemonic control over Parliament, accelerating the pace of reforming
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legislation drastically under the leadership of William Ewart Gladstone.57 Most of these
reforms were targeted at the working-class, particularly in the fields of education and
local government reform designed at ending corruption.58 However, the most important
of the Liberal policies from 1874 forward was their commitment to further electoral
reform, the most significant of which was a commitment to household suffrage.59 In the
late 1870s and early 1880s Gladstone drew the ire of Liberals in Parliament by
abandoning the party platform in favor of reversing Disraeli’s imperial policies.60 Matters
were worsened by the disruption of Irish Liberals in Parliament, who supported none of
Gladstone’s measures save the 1881 Land Act, which led to the departure of some of the
aristocratic Whigs from the Liberal party. Facing disappointment from all sectors of the
Liberal party, Gladstone introduced the Third Reform Act, increasing the number of
voters to around 5.7 million, which amounted to sixty percent of the male population
being enfranchised by 1885.61 When taken together, the two acts comprising the Third
Reform Act extended the urban enfranchisement of the Second Reform Act into the
counties and essentially established the modern single seat constituencies in Parliament.62
Thus, the Third Reform Act became the point at which Parliament opened its doors to the
suburbs. Through the redistribution of seats in Parliament, the new seats were given
largely to suburban areas, which were overwhelmingly middle-class areas and were
mostly Conservative.63 The 1884 reform did not introduce a wider franchise; it only
extended the provisions of the 1867 Act into the counties, without altering the basic
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thinking on who should and should not have the vote.64 However, the Third Reform Act
did change the nature of the political nation in the years following 1884-5. The most
radical feature of the reform was the new redistribution of seats, which broke up the old
country constituencies and with them the traditional bonds of patronage and deference.65
The Third Reform Act also created new constituencies in heavily urban, working-class
areas of major cities, making class the most important determining factor in major
cities.66 By creating a framework for a class-based political system, the Third Reform Act
was more of a step towards democracy than either its framers or its critics ever allowed
for.67
It is this step toward democracy that sets the Third Reform Act apart from its
predecessors in 1832 and 1867. Although not intentional in nature, by enfranchising the
working-class in the counties and redistributing seats in Parliament, the Third Reform
Act set Britain further along the path towards true democracy. Lawrence goes so far as to
claim that the Third Reform Act was instrumental in initiating the emancipation of the
agricultural laborer.68 He goes on to argue that:
Within a decade elected county and parish councils existed alongside the
new, more democratic Parliamentary divisions and the parties found
themselves dragged inexorably into a competition for the farm laborer’s vote.
Reform heralded an explosion of political meetings across the countryside.
As late as 1884 one still finds local Conservative parties such as the Oswestry
Association holding no political meetings at all outside elections for dear that
they might stir their quiescent radical foes into action. But once ‘John Hodge’
had the vote such an approach was unthinkable, not least because agricultural
laborers were thought to be all but immune to traditional means of political
persuasion.69
64
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For Lawrence, the enfranchisement of the agricultural laborer had significant importance
for the nature of political discourse. Many in the party organizations assumed that the
new rural voters were poorly educated and incapable of understanding political
pamphlets or fancy campaign prose.70 As such, politicians were reminded to ‘keep things
simple’ for their largely uneducated and indifferent voters, noting that voters were much
more likely to be swayed by passionate campaign oratory than by policy and campaign
platforms.71 Thus, one of the most significant impacts of the Third Reform Act was,
according to Lawrence, an alteration in the relationship between MPs and their
constituencies, as evidenced by language used on the campaign trail and in political
meetings.
Mary Chadwick takes a similar stance on the impact of the Third Reform Act on
the relationship between government and the people in the last years of he nineteenth
century. However, rather than examining the change in political discourse, Chadwick
instead chooses to examine the redistribution of seats. For her, the largest benefit of the
Third Reform Act was the creation of new seats in heavily urban areas, with the ratio
between the largest and smallest electorates being 1:8 rather than 1:250 as it had been in
the years before 1885.72 For Chadwick, the importance of this redistribution was that for
the first time, the metropolis finally received adequate representation in Parliament.73
Once this redistribution was completed, the increased representation of the urban
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working-class through the creation of single member districts created a system in which
the two major parties had to make a more concerted effort to appeal to potential voters.
Sean Lang takes a more critical view of the Third Reform Act, arguing that it did
not do enough to usher in true democracy. He claims that despite the franchise extension
of 1884, forty percent of the male working-class were still without the vote, as were all
women.74 He continues by arguing that even though the vote was expanded into the
counties the old ties of patronage still existed in the counties, and that with no campaign
to free agricultural laborers from the system of deference, the old ways in the counties
was slow to die.75 Lang also has criticism for the Redistribution Act, claiming that the
creation of new seats in the counties forced suburban votes to be either included in the
county seats, in which their mostly Conservative votes did not matter, or in urban districts
where their votes were not enough to have an impact on the ultimate outcome of any
election.76 He argues that the Third Reform Act did not introduce democracy because the
government did not believe in it. Instead, Lang suggests that popular politics remained an
essentially intellectual affair and that the extension of the 1867 franchise did not indicate
an change in the basic thinking of who should and should not be allowed to vote.77
This thesis is split into five chapters, with each discussing a specific aspect of
British politics at the time of the Third Reform Act. Chapter 2 covers the Conservative
ascendancy of the last two decades of the Victorian period and how the changes brought
by the Third Reform Act enabled this ascendancy. Chapter 3 looks at the Liberal party
disintegration during the same period and how the Liberal party’s inability to appeal to
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popular opinion caused their fall from power. Chapter 4 explores the effects of the Third
Reform Act on the Irish Home Rule crisis. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the effects of the
Third Reform Act on the importance of pressure groups. Chapter 5 focuses on
sociopolitical pressure groups and how reformers outside of government exerted pressure
on Parliament to implement changes to British society and politics. Chapter 6 focuses on
economic pressure groups and how MPs were influenced by public opinion in their
implementation of economic reforms. When taken together these chapters will provide a
more complete picture of how the Third Reform Act created a political system which was
more democratic than that which had existed before the Act became law.
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CHAPTER II

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY DURING THE CONSERVATIVE
ASCENDANCY

The twenty years following the passage of the Third Reform Act, from 18861906, saw a Conservative ascendancy, during which, the Conservative Party reversed
almost forty years of political minority and served as the majority ruling party for nearly
the entire twenty-year period, with only a three-year period of Liberal government under
Gladstone and then Lord Rosebery from 1892 until 1895.78 This period has been the
subject of intensive study from historians, with differing opinions on the causes and
importance of the Conservative return to power. Martin Pugh argues that the
Conservative return to power was caused by a sea change in British politics. Pugh states
that during this time the middle classes and Whig aristocrats were anxious to join the
Conservative party in a defense of property and other British institutions from the threat
of radicalism, socialism, and Irish nationalism. Many of the radical grievances at this
point had been satisfied, and those Nonconformists now within the political system were
more inclined to vote for the Conservative party, especially in the face of external threats
in the form of colonial rivalry and the Anglo-German naval race which together created a
more nationalistic mood with helped the Conservative party by pushing domestic issues
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off the agenda.79 Jonathan Parry takes a different view; arguing that the rise of
Conservative party power was caused solely by the disintegration of the Liberal party
resulting from the Irish Home Rule crisis. Parry claims that the sectionalism and
radicalism of the Liberal party allowed the Conservative party to coalesce around a
nationalistic platform of maintaining the Empire in full.80 Parry’s argument that the
Conservative rise to power was solely caused by Liberal disintegration may be due to his
focus on the fortunes of Liberal government, but is nonetheless too narrow an
interpretation. A more accurate and thorough explanation for the rise of the Conservative
party from 1886-1906 comes from Jon Lawrence who provides a multifaceted
explanation across two works. Lawrence argues that the Conservative party’s ascendancy
was caused in part by the active efforts of the party to persuade the urban working and
middle classes to vote for their candidates, and because of the disintegration of the
Liberal party in the midst of the Irish Home Rule crisis.81
The passage of the Third Reform Act created a political system in which direct
appeal to the newly enfranchised working classes was a necessity. While it is true that the
working classes in the cities had been given the franchise in 1867, the redistribution of
seats under the Third Reform Act created single member districts in industrial cities,
which meant that both Liberal and Conservative candidates had to appeal more
effectively and directly to the currents of public opinion to persuade their constituencies
rather than relying on traditional voting patterns, as seen by the sharp decline in

79

Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 107.
Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 308-9.
81
Jon Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867-1914
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 200-1; Jon Lawrence, “Class and Gender in the Making
of Urban Toryism, 1880-1914,” The English Historical Review 108 no, 428 (1993): 629.
80

21

uncontested returns in the 1885 election which was the first held since passage of the
Third Reform Act.82 This reliance on currents of public opinion for electoral success was
beneficial for the Conservative party as they had a broader coalition than did the Liberal
party, and sought to maintain the status quo, whereas the Liberals were more focused on
unpopular social reform campaigns advocated for by a minority of potential voters. This
change is seen in Leeds, which was a three-member constituency in the years 1868-1885,
then split into five single member districts following the Third Reform Act.83 This change
resulted in political power being more closely correlated with population in districts
across Britain, with the difference in population from the largest to smallest district being
8-1 after the Third Reform Act, whereas it had been 250-1 before the Act’s passage.84
This redistribution, combined with the middle-class flight to the suburbs had caused the
towns and cities of Britain to become increasingly cohesive working-class
communities.85
Ultimately, it was the Conservative party that was best prepared for this new
challenge, and thus it was the Conservative party that gained enough support of the
middle and working classes to return to power. The Conservative party employed two
strategies to achieve this political advantage over their Liberal party counterparts. The
first was an appeal to middle-class industrialists in urban areas, the so-called “Villa
Tories.” By reasserting their role as the defenders of property, the Conservatives were
able to maintain the support of the middle-class that they had enjoyed throughout the
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nineteenth century. The second strategy employed was one aimed towards gaining the
support of the newly enfranchised working classes in the wake of the Third Reform Act.
To achieve this, the Conservatives sought to associate themselves with aspects of
Victorian working-class culture. By sponsoring social clubs, associating with football
teams, and defending the drink, the Conservatives presented themselves as more in touch
with working-class values than the Liberal party which, in an attempt to gain more
middle-class support overlooked working-class values because of the obsession with
moral reform agenda of faddists.86
The dramatic rise of the Conservative party in 1886 was mirrored by the split and
collapse of the Liberal party. The Liberal party split, caused by differences over the Irish
Home Rule question occurred at the same time the Conservative ascendancy began, and
was a major cause of the Conservative rise to power. The Liberal party split was not the
sole cause for the rise of the Conservative party in the last fifteen years of the nineteenth
century, but it was a major factor, as disaffected Liberals caucused with the Tories
following the Irish Home Rule Crisis. The ineptitude of the Liberal party in appealing to
its voters cannot be seen as the sole cause for the rise of the Conservative party either. To
suggest either of those causes as the primary culprit would be to imply that the rise of
Conservative party power was merely a passive benefit from the collapse of Liberal
government. Instead, the Conservative ascendancy was caused by an active effort of the
part of the Conservative party to expand their political organization and appeal to a newly
expanded electorate and aided passively by internal strife within the Liberal party. By
appealing to broad sections of the British polity, the Conservative party was able to
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solidify their support among the middle-class by presenting themselves as the defenders
of propertied interests and the Empire, especially during the Irish Home Rule Crisis,
while gaining significant enough support from the working-class by appealing to
working-class culture and defending “English” values to gain a victory over the Liberal
party.
The Conservative ascendancy in the late Victorian period is a subject that has
received much attention from historians in the latter half of the twentieth century. The
discussion of the Conservative rise to power has fallen into two schools. On the one hand,
the Conservative rise to power is a product of the active efforts of the Conservative party
to solidify support among their upper and middle-class and attempts to appeal to the
newly enfranchised working-class voters after the Third Reform Act in 1885.87 On the
other, the Conservative party merely benefits from Liberal ineptitude in the late-Victorian
period, only coming to power because of the split in the Liberal party caused by the
controversial adoption of Irish Home Rule as a central tenet of the Liberal party platform.
To best understand this debate, it is useful to examine the interpretation of the
Conservative party’s efforts, the Liberal party’s ineptitude, and the Liberal split in 18856.88
Villa Toryism is the brand of Toryism that appealed to the middle-class. Matthew
Roberts contributes to the argument that the Conservative ascendancy was a result of
their own efforts. He explains that Conservatives were able to appeal to the newly
enfranchised masses by rejecting the cold Liberal doctrines of utilitarianism and moral
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improvement, and instead focused on the old Tory-radical tradition.89 In his study of
Villa Toryism in Leeds, Roberts explains that the driving force behind efforts to diminish
middle-class support for the Liberal Party was Leeds Church Extension Society, which
sought to build more churches.90 This is indicative of the Conservative efforts to present
themselves as the defenders of the Established Church of England, which resonated with
the middle-class. The importance of the Established Church to Conservative support is
important not just religious grounds, however. The party’s support of the Establish
Church also appealed to their jingoistic defense of Empire, as the Established Church
stood for Empire and Protestantism, in contrast to the devolution and Catholicism
associated with Irish Home Rule.
Roberts also shows Conservative efforts to gain support among the workingclasses and is quick to counter historians who claim that working-class Conservatism is
merely political deviancy.91 He shows that the Conservative actively campaigned to gain
working-class support by presenting themselves as a non-ideological and pragmatic
party.92 This effort to appeal to the working-class is echoed by Jon Lawrence, who shows
how the Conservative party deliberately associated themselves with aspects of urban
society such as public houses, football, and racing to distinguish themselves from the
moral reforming Liberals.93
The necessity of more effectively organizing the urban working-classes for
Conservative politics is seen in a meeting of the Conservative Party, as reported in the
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Leeds Mercury on 23 May 1887. Party leaders claimed that the Conservatives had long
been guilty of understating the value of a careful and exact organization.94 In this meeting
Conservative leaders called on the party to effectively organize to counter the extant
National Liberal Federation (NLF) and National League, which had been promoting
Liberal ideas. They believed that Conservative power in government, which had been
lacking since the 1840s had never equaled the real extent and predominance of
Conservative ideals amongst the people of Britain. It was suggested that Liberal success
could be attributed to their alliance with the Nonconformists because while the
Established Church and Wesleyans (traditional Conservative allies) had no interest in
becoming involved in politics, the Nonconformists did not share that same conviction.
The presiding speaker of the meeting closed with a call to action for the Party to appeal to
labor organizations and the church, without which the Radicals would be left powerless.
The speaker claimed that organizing for the party will be “no work which the
Conservative Club will find more useful to the party and the country than in stimulating
organisations of this kind, and carrying them out to the fullest limits and to the most
remote corners of the country.”95
However, not all historians agree that the Conservative party regained power
because of their own efforts to appeal to voters. Hugh Stephens argues instead that the
Third Reform Act played a significant role in creating the Conservative ascendancy.
According to Stephens, by the 1880s the distinction between county and borough was
essentially non-existent, and that the Reform Act narrowed the gap between the two
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parties ideologically, making it easier for the Liberal Unionists to jump ship.96 Thus, the
changing electoral circumstances were the driving factor behind the Conservative
ascendancy, rather than any efforts on the part of Conservatives to improve their
fortunes.97 This interpretation is supported by reports around the 1886 general election,
which pointed to the Liberal government being defeated because of an alliance between
the Liberal Unionists and the Conservative party.98 This alliance is seen in the speech
delivered by Peter Macliver during the 1886 general election. Macliver claims that his
opponent in that election had initially come forward as a Liberal but had since been
adopted into the Liberal Unionist fold. Macliver goes on to claim that his opponent was
going to be welcomed into the Conservative party the very night of his speech.99
However, this Stephens’s interpretation of the Conservative ascendancy makes too much
of the ideological similarities between the Liberal Unionists and the Conservative party.
While these two parties agreed on their opposition to Home Rule, that should not be
taken as an indication that they collaborated on a broad spectrum of policy. In the years
following the defeat of Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule measure, the Liberal Unionists were
putting forward the same radical policies they had advocated for when they were
competing against the Conservatives as part of the Liberal party.100 This shows that
although the alliance between the Conservative party and the Liberal Unionists party was
effective in defeating the Irish Home Rule measure, the claim that ideological similarities
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between the two parties made it easier for Liberal Unionists to jump ship to the
Conservative party lacks nuance.
The Third Reform Act meant that previously large electoral constituencies were
broken up into smaller, single member districts, as seen in Leeds where the three member
constituency was split into five new districts.101 The ultimate effect here is the
democratization of politics, and the beginning of what Joseph Chamberlain referred to as
‘government of the people, by the people.’102 It is from this point that issues of the
condition of the poor, the legitimacy of wealth and property, and Irish Home Rule were
to feature prominently as permanent fixtures of the political agenda.103
Rather than examining the Conservative party’s efforts to garner support among
the middle and working-class voters, some historians instead choose to view the
Conservative ascendancy through a framework centered around Liberal ineptitude.
Although not giving it primacy in his argument, Jon Lawrence takes this view in his work
on Urban Toryism, arguing that popular Toryism emerged as a critique of Liberal
machine politics.104 Other historians have also claimed that Liberal ineptitude in
appealing to their constituencies created a situation in which the Conservatives could
return to power. Hammond argues that the Liberal party split was caused by a clash of
social class. His argument has lost some credibility over time, but should nevertheless be
considered for its assessment that Home Rule was the turning point in British history.105
Biagini claims that the Liberal party’s failure to adequately mobilize their political
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organization led to the rank-and-file party members challenging party leadership over the
future of party policy.106 Fraser argues along this line, stating that Liberal policy
regarding property and reform created the wave of opinion needed for the Liberal
Unionists to carry their support to the Conservative party.107 Lawrence continues that the
Liberal commitment to moral reform damaged their ability to appeal to the workingclass.108
Finally, it is important to examine the way that the Liberal party split has been
interpreted by historians over time. Initially, the social conflict theory gained much
traction among historians.109 This can be seen in the writing of Annie Porritt, writing
shortly before the First World War, in which she explains that the Home Rule vote split
the Liberal Party, causing the dissolution of Parliament and the creation of a Conservative
government with a 118 member majority.110 Lubenow asserts that many of Gladstone’s
contemporaries agreed with this social conflict theory, seeing it the reason for the Liberal
Unionist defection.111
However, Lubenow himself rejects the social conflict theory, instead favoring the
idea that the Liberal party split because of political rather than social reasons. He shows
that despite the Liberal Unionist defection Gladstone still held the majority of all classes,
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and that the party split over issues that did not fit properly into the Liberal agenda.112
Stephens agrees with Lubenow, arguing that by the time of the 1886 election the two
parties had become similar, and that this made it easier for the Liberal Unionists to
defect.113 This is echoed by Fraser, who argued that by 1892 Chamberlain had moved
closer to the Conservatives than some of his Liberal Unionist allies including
Hartington.114 Fraser argues that the line between Conservative and Liberal had blurred in
the aftermath of the Third Reform Act, and that while Irish Home Rule may have played
a role in the initial split of the Liberal party it did not factor significantly in the permanent
separation of the Liberal Unionists.115 Fraser’s argument should be discounted however,
as the split between Liberals and Liberal Unionists was a permanent one, and the central
point of contention in that split was the Irish Home Rule issue, which remained
unresolved until after the First World War.116
The traditional bastion of Conservative party support during the nineteenth
century was the landed class. However, during the latter portions of the nineteenth
century, there was also a significant defection of middle-class voters to the Conservative
party, a fact that is given little attention or significance by those who promote the
‘electoral sociological’ explanation of the rise of the Conservative party.117 This
movement of middle-class voters to the Conservative party, “Villa Tories” as they came
to be known, were a broad-based coalition of voters and represented a self-reliant,
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hierarchical version of Conservatism.118 The Conservative party was able to entice this
contingent of voters in the late nineteenth century through a concerted campaign designed
to take votes away from the Liberal party. By presenting themselves as the defenders of
propertied, especially the urban property interests, the Conservative party was able to
persuade factory owners who were concerned over Liberal party factory reforms. The
Conservative party also gained the support of the middle-class through their support of
the Empire, as maintaining the status quo was seen as a benefit for industrialists who
relied on imperial markets. By appealing to the economic interests of the middle-class the
Conservative party was able to break the Liberal party dominance over the borough seats.
In the new system of electoral politics brought about by the Third Reform Act, this was
an indictment of Liberal party machine politics, which many middle-class and workingclass voters felt was putting the interests of the party over the interests of the nation.
As can be seen in the case of Leeds, the Conservative party mounted an
aggressive campaign to stamp out middle-class liberalism, both to rally and reassure their
supporters to and expand their traditional voting base beyond Anglican supporters.119
According to Matthew Roberts:
The active pursuit of what was increasingly termed 'moderate Liberal support'
by the Leeds Conservative party, which presented itself as the defender of
property against the threat of a radicalized Liberal party, dated from the early
1870s. This led the Conservative party to exaggerate both the power of the
radicals within the Liberal party, nationally and locally, and the disruptive
and destructive effects of the radical programme.120
Thus, the Conservative party was making an active effort to court middle-class voters
away from the Liberal party. As suggested by Roberts, this effort was necessary for the
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Conservative party to be electorally relevant, because contrary to previous interpretations,
Villadom was not always the electoral heartland of the late-Victorian Conservative
party.121 Instead, the enfranchisement and redistribution of seats created by the Third
Reform Act created pockets of Conservative party support in the suburbs and industrial
areas; areas in which the Conservative party had to work hard to maintain support.122
With this shift in the electoral landscape, the Conservative Party looked for a new way to
appeal to voters and gain support in those pockets.
To maintain that support, the Conservative party attacked the Liberal party as
being concerned with socialist land reform legislation and claimed that the Liberal party
could not be trusted with property rights and landed interests.123 The Conservative leader
Salisbury argued that all propertied classes had a reason to be afraid of the Liberal party’s
land reform policy, specifically naming the Irish Land Bill as socialist.124
The Third Reform Act caused a shift in the electoral landscape, which also led to
a shift in Conservative party strategy. Unlike the Conservative party of previous years,
the late-Victorian Conservative party became increasingly interested in the urban
propertied elites, spurred by the redistribution of seats skewing electoral political in favor
of the boroughs.125 Through this campaign, the Conservative party was able to solidify
their hold over the ‘white-collar’ professionals living in the suburbs.126 To gain the
support of the urban elites, the Conservative party employed a strategy of using local
notables to stand for office and boost Conservative party commitment to civic
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engagement in the community. This caused the urban elites to attach their identity and
significance to the Conservative party and overcame their hesitance to support unknowns
standing for office.127
Part of this middle-class support for the Conservative party, especially in the cities
also came from a dissatisfaction with Liberal party machine politics. As Lawrence states:
Central to this reaction was popular suspicion of machine politics as
epitomized by Joseph Chamberlain's Birmingham Liberal Association -- the
so-called Birmingham caucus. In the larger cities, where the caucus was
generally most conspicuous, Conservative politicians seized on latent
antagonism towards party as an essential element in the construction of an
alternative, non-Radical political discourse. This discourse shared
Radicalism's traditional concern with political exclusion, but the emphasis
was now shifted from the exclusiveness of a restrictive franchise, to the
exclusiveness of organized politics. The new Tory politics were not,
therefore, simply a dry critique of organizational procedures within the
Liberal party. Rather, the Tory case against the caucus encapsulated a much
broader critique of the changing nature of late Victorian Liberalism.128
Many of the leaders of the urban Conservative party were wealthy merchants and
manufacturers who had become disenchanted with the machine politics of the Liberal
party and the changing nature of Victorian liberalism. According to them, the Liberal
party had been hijacked by fanatical Nonconformists and faddists, an attack designed to
paint the Liberal party as a close-minded and static sect that had lost its purpose and
direction.129 According to the Conservative party, the Liberal party’s obsession with
faddism had caused them to give up their libertarian philosophy on individual liberty,
instead focusing on a ‘coercive’ model of state-sponsored reform without regard for
social customs.130 The final critique of Liberal party machine politics was the that this
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preoccupation with moral reform caused the Liberal party to put their own interests above
those of the nation.131 The Conservative party offered instead a ‘One Nation’ program
based around patriotic and anti-faddist rhetoric to construct politics of the nonpolitical.132 This policy allowed the Conservative party to gain the support of the urban
middle-class by appealing to their patriotism and pragmatism.
Thus, the Conservative ascendancy of 1886-1906 saw the Conservative party
replace the Liberal party as the governing power in Britain after a forty-year period of
Liberal party domination. This was done by a concerted effort on the part of Conservative
party organization to appeal to new constituencies while maintaining their support from
the traditional power bases. The middle-class remained a stronghold of Conservative
party power because of Conservative party efforts to present themselves as the defenders
of property. This helped bring urban industrialists into the conservative fold, as they
viewed the Conservative party as being most likely to protect their interests. The
working-class was incorporated into the Conservative party following the implementation
of the Third Reform Act because of an active Conservative party effort to appeal to the
new voters. This was accomplished through associating the Conservative party with
aspects of urban working-class culture such as leisure and the drink. This is seen through
the establishment of Conservative party social clubs. The Leamington Spa Courier and
Warwickshire Standard reported that in the years immediately following the Third
Reform Act, Conservative organization had been extended extensively towards the
middle and working-classes.133 The Conservative party also defended the status quo of

Lawrence, “Class and Gender,” 638.
Roberts, “’Villa Toryism’,” 231.
133
“Benefits of a Provident Organization.” Leamington Spa Courier and Warwickshire Standard, 7 August,
1886.
131
132

34

the Anglican Church, as the working-class was wooed by stability. The stability was also
emphasized by appealing to the self-interest of the working-class. By presenting itself as
the defender of the British Empire, the Conservative party was able to portray an image
of a party concerned with protecting British industrial interests, which in turn meant that
industrial workers would be able to enjoy regular employment and competitive wages.
However, it is not adequate or appropriate to only consider one cause of the
Conservative ascendancy and the associated decline and split of the Liberal party. As
demonstrated above, it is clear that the Conservative party played a major role in their
own rise to power, but that does not discount the role that the Liberal party played in their
own downfall. Lawrence, Hammond, and Biagini all give credence to the theory that the
Liberal party was responsible for its own misfortunes in the years following the Third
Reform Act.134 The tensions within the Liberal party can be seen in 1885, as the London
Correspondent for the Ipswich Journal argued that Chamberlain and his colleagues in
government had good reason to be upset with the state of their party. According to this
correspondent Jesse Collins had already caused a minor split in the Liberal party over
agricultural reforms, and his propaganda campaign had cost the Liberal party a
significant portion of its support from agricultural laborers.135 Chamberlain is more
pointed in his explanation of the split in the Liberal party and its subsequent failure to
accomplish any of its goals. He places the blame squarely on the shoulders of Gladstone
for being unable to compromise or move on from Irish Home Rule. The Edinburgh
Evening News quotes Chamberlain’s article about Disestablishment in Wales in the
Baptist stating:
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Unfortunately at the very moment when the prospects of redress seem
to be the most favourable, its has been overshadowed and darkened by the
sudden introduction of a new subject of political contention, whose
settlement may be long delayed. It may take ten or twenty years, or may even
never be accomplished; but whether to process occupies a generation or a
century “poor little Wales” must wait until Mr. Parnell is satisfied, and Mr.
Gladstone’s policy adopted. They will not wait alone…Thirty-two millions of
people must go without much-needed legislation because three million are
disloyal, while nearly 600 members of the Imperial Parliament will be
reduced to forced inactivity because some 80 delegates, representing the
policy and receiving the pay of the Chicago Convention, are determined to
obstruct all business until their demands have been conceded.136
Chamberlain continues, claiming that as long as the Liberal party remains dedicated to
Irish Home Rule, it will remain a shattered and impotent party.137 The Liberal party’s
decline and eventual schism can also be partially explained by the hesitation of some
members to change their way of thinking about political organization following the Third
Reform Act. While political organizations were not new with the Third Reform Act, as
the NLF had been founded in 1877, they Liberal party did not make as effective use of
their political organizations as did their Conservative opponents in the two decades of
Conservative ascendancy. William Clarke decried the new system of political
organization, claiming it to be “machine politics” in the American style, and that this new
organization would remove individual agency from politics altogether. Clarke argued that
machine politics amounted to nothing more than wire-pulling and that although the
political parties would remain, there would be no more valuable work for them to do.138
Some were even more harsh in their criticism of the new political system than Clarke
was. A correspondent from The Nottingham Evening Post stated that for an MP to freely
speak his mind about the policy of his party leader was seen as the “highest of high

“Mr. Chamberlain on the Liberal Split,” Edinburgh Evening News, 25 February 1887.
“Mr. Chamberlain on the Liberal Split,” Edinburgh Evening News, 25 February 1887.
138
“Liberalism in Liverpool,” Liverpool Mercury etc, 22 January 1884.
136
137

36

treason” in the eyes of the party machine.139 This mistrust of political organization in the
Liberal party can still be seen into the 1890s, as evidenced by Grant Lawson’s rejection
of a Justice of the Peace Bill on the grounds that it would “tend to foster political wirepulling with regard to the magisterial bench.”140 This shows that the Liberal party was
responsible for its own struggles because they were unable to effectively organize in the
same way as the Conservative party.
Thus, the Conservative ascendancy of 1886-1906 was not merely a passive
benefit of the disintegration of the Liberal party due to its own ineptitude. Instead, a more
nuanced view of the Conservative ascendancy is required. One the one hand, the
Conservative party did make a concerted effort to increase their organizational abilities in
the years following the Third Reform Act. This increased ability to organize allowed to
Conservative party to more accurately gauge public opinion and appeal to the newly
enfranchised agricultural laborers. On the other hand, the Liberal party was largely
responsible for their own decline and collapse in the years around the Third Reform Act.
The party was unable to organize effectively due to trepidation over “machine politics” as
explained above. This inability to organize left the party unable to draw significant
support, especially in the years after 1886, when commitment to Irish Home Rule cause a
split between Liberal and Liberal Unionists and made the Liberal party deeply unpopular
for the next twenty years.
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CHAPTER III

THE LATE VICTORIAN LIBERAL PARTY COLLAPSE

While the Conservative ascendancy was aided by the active efforts of the
Conservative party to appeal to new sections of the electorate, the failings of the Liberal
party during the same period must not be overlooked. It was from these failings that the
Conservative party was able to draw much of its ammunition in the fight for electoral
victory against the Liberal party. The Liberal party during this time decided on a policy
course that became highly unpopular with voters and led to their decline in electoral
relevance, and perhaps more importantly. Their schism from the Liberal Unionists. The
first issue that plagued the Liberal party was their commitment to radical social reform.
During this period the Liberal party, spurred by their Nonconformist supporters and MPs,
attempted to introduce social reforms that proved to be deeply unpopular with their
supporters. The Liberal party during this same time was losing support over what some
claimed was their dependence on “faddists” to be politically relevant. Rohan McWilliam
argues that these faddists (single-issue pressure groups) had become essential to the
Liberal party by the late Victorian period and that Gladstone depended on their support to
maintain his position as the leader of the government.141 The Liberal party also suffered
from organizational problems during this period which led to their decline. The NLF was
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the largest Liberal organization at the time, but many were hesitant to join the
organization over fears that it would result in machine politics in the American style.142
Furthermore, there was some uncertainty about Gladstone as a leader. Many had expected
him to retire from politics and his return as Liberal party leader put a strain on the party.
Gladstone’s leadership and his decision to tie the Liberal party to unpopular measures
like Irish Home Rule was the reason for the loss of Liberal power, and the eventual
schism with the Liberal Unionists.143 Finally, the most pressing issue of the period, Irish
Home Rule, is also the issue that was responsible for the most tension within the Liberal
party. When Gladstone supported Irish Home Rule publicly in 1885, and tried to push the
issue through Parliament, he lost one third of the Liberal party in government, and the
unpopularity of the measure made the Liberal party politically irrelevant for most of the
next twenty years.144 One of the reasons this measure was particularly unpopular was the
increasingly prominent nationalistic mood of the time, in which pride in the Empire was
growing and its maintenance became a major political tool. For some, the Gladstonian
support for the Irish Home Rule measure amounted to the first blow in the breakup of the
Empire.145 As such, the Liberal party was derided for its desire to see the Empire
dismantled, which allowed the Liberal Unionists and the Conservatives to improve their
electoral standings by coming out in support of the Empire.146 When taken together,
these factors provide a picture of the Liberal party decline and ultimate dissolution in the
late nineteenth century. The years following the Third Reform Act were the first in a new
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era in which public opinion was much more important than had previously been the case.
The Liberal party failed to effectively organize their base to convince new voters to
support their party and the policies adopted by the Liberals during this period were also
unpopular with the British electorate. The result of these failures was the decline of the
Liberal party, the schism with the Liberal Unionists over the Irish Home Rule issue, and
the political irrelevance of the Liberal party from 1886-1906. The Conservative party
took power during this time, and although they did much to position themselves to gain
sufficient support to take power from the Liberal party in the general election, they were
aided in this goal by the poor fortunes of the Liberal party. These poor fortunes, which
cost the Liberal party its nearly forty years of hegemony, were largely the result of the
Liberal party’s own designs.
During the late Victorian period, the Liberal party became obsessed with a social
reform program that was deemed a moral crusade by some. This policy of social reform
was heavily influenced by the Nonconformist sectors of the Liberal party base, and these
supporters, often referred to derisively as faddists, advocated for reforms centered around
one main issue their group wished to change, with that issue often being temperance.147
This commitment to faddists, and the tensions it caused can even be seen in the period
immediately preceding the Third Reform Act. A correspondent with the Northern Echo
wrote about those tensions, making the argument that the Liberal party was in the wrong
for supporting faddist measures instead of putting the full force of their legislative power
behind the 1884 Reform Bill.148 In the years preceding the Third Reform Act,
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Gladstone’s support of unpopular moral reform campaign did not come with a significant
cost for the Liberal party, as they maintained political hegemony for four decades until
1886. In the years following the Third Reform Act however, this support would be costly,
as the Liberal party lost seats in 1885 to the Conservative party, and then were swept
from power in 1886 because of the unpopular Irish Home Rule issue.
Conservative party leaders were also vocal about their distaste for the Liberal
party’s obsession with faddists, and thought it against the best interests of the nation.
Charles Dalrymple MP railed against the faddists in 1885, arguing their insistence on
Disestablishment was the wrong course for Scotland because the Church belonged to the
people, and was a Church of the people, especially poor people. Dalrymple continued by
claiming that the people were heavily invested in the Church and would defend it
attacked by the government. Dalrymple closed his speech by stating that the faddists were
not likely to see favorable action on their desire for Disestablishment, but that they were
nevertheless insistent on “sinking every other question” until their grievances had been
redressed.149 This alliance with faddists was a primary cause for the Liberal party’s loss
of support within the working-classes. This is evident in the campaign for education
reform and disestablishment of the Church of England. In Chamberlain’s radical
programme of 1885-6 the Liberation Society plan for total disendowment of the Church
of England was included for the first time.150 This was a natural progression of radical
Liberal party thought, as the previous decades had seen a consistent growth of anti-
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Church sentiment amongst radicals in the Liberal party.151 This was most obvious in the
debate over public education. Nonconformists and radicals within the Liberal party were
opposed to free education if voluntary schools were shut down due to lack of funds.152 In
England and Wales at the time, Nonconformists were compelled to send their children to
schools under Church of England management. This fact produced a powerful argument
among many Nonconformists to bring voluntary schools under the control of elected
schools boards.153 The collectivist approach to social policy can again be seen in the NLF
proclamation that no settlements of the issue would be considered satisfactory unless all
schools receiving public money were subject to public control through elected School
Boards.154 However, this movement towards disendowment and disestablishment was a
major blunder on the part of the Liberal party. The ploy alienated moderate liberals and
did not win any support for the radical wing of the Liberal party.155 What the radical calls
for disestablishment did do however was widen the growing split between Chamberlain
and Gladstone, which became permanent over the issue of Irish Home Rule.156
Chamberlain saw this split as being entirely caused by Gladstone’s support for Irish
Home Rule and believed that the rift between the two factions would not be mended until
the Home Rule issue was settled.157
In the late nineteenth century, the Liberal party abandoned their traditional
libertarian view on social reform for a state-interventionist approach, spurred by the
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moral populism of the radical Nonconformists.158 Of these moral reform movements
perhaps none was as widespread and influential as the temperance movement. Henry
Cust spoke on these reform movements, and temperance in particular at a meeting of the
Bourne and District Workingman’s Club, claiming that the attempts to enact temperance
reform had ushered in unprecedented partisanship which had ruined politics and turned
the politicians jealous and bitter. Cust went on the say that these reform groups were
obsessed with their own sphere of influence and cared little for other concerns. Cust felt
that this hindered the chances of progress and argued that such attempts at reform were
criminal.159 This negative view of temperance reformers and their impact on the political
process is further evidenced in the debate over the local option. It was not until 1895 that
Liberal Unionists were able to bring a local option bill before Parliament with a realistic
chance of it passing, due to the Liberal party’s tactics of blocking any such measure to
appease the temperance faddists in their support base. According to a writer for The
Belfast News-Letter, had it not been for these tactics, the local option question could have
been handled many years earlier, and in a practical matter.160
However, not all people in Britain viewed the moral social reforms in a negative
light. Social reformers, encouraged by the evangelical revivalism sweeping through
Britain in the latter part of the nineteenth century viewed self-improvement as the main
business of life and sought to shape their Christian beliefs into reform movements.161
This is evidenced by the foundation and growth of the United Kingdom Alliance, a
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radical temperance movement supported by radical Nonconformists in the Liberal party
and dedicated to temperance based on the local option.162 A leader of the United
Kingdom Alliance, Dr. Frederic Richard Lees, argued that the drink was a public
problem, and as such needed a public solution.163 This was a contradiction of Liberal
party policy during the first half of the nineteenth century, which saw government take an
active role in economic affairs, as evidenced by the repeal of the Corn Laws, but
generally maintain a laissez-faire stance in the social sphere.164 The cause for this change
was the evolution of philosophical thought on the human condition, which saw poverty
and vice as symptoms of environment rather than inherent character flaws which must be
overcome. As such, alcoholism was not always the fault of the individual and could be
overcome by government action.165 This collectivist approach to social reform did allow
for progress in civil engineering and public health while also decreasing the likelihood of
revolution and political radicalism.166 However, collectivist and state interventionist
social reform also widened the gap between the social policies of the Liberal and
Conservative parties and alienated many of the more moderate Liberal party members.167
Although the Liberal party’s dedication to unpopular social reform measures, and
their extreme reliance on faddists for support were definite factors in their decline in the
years flowing the Third Reform Act they are not the only culprits. Just as guilty were the
organizational problems within the Liberal party. In the years following the Third Reform
Act, a strong political organization was vital for electoral success. In an election which
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saw the size of the electorate doubled since the 1867 reforms, it was essential for both
parties to persuade enough newly enfranchised voters to ensure their own success at the
polls.168 Despite the existence of the NLF as early as 1877, the Liberal party failed to
effectively organize their base to support their measures, and further failed to measure the
temperature of public opinion on the Irish Home Rule question. An anonymous writer
under the name “Home Ruler” responded to a letter to the editor in Bristol arguing that
the Liberal party was beaten in the 1886 election because they were not effectively
organized. The writer claims that “the Liberals could beat the Tories in argument, but the
Tories beat us in organization.”169 From this letter, it becomes clear that the Liberal party
believed they suffered from organizational problems that cost them seats in the 1886
election. A meeting of the Leeds United Liberal Association showed these problems or
organization were foremost in the minds of the Liberal party leaders. At this meeting, a
discussion was help over the state of the party, and those in attendance agreed that more
was needed of the party’s organization to spread the message of the party’s leaders, who
it was agreed were the wisest and ablest the country had ever known. In particular it was
pointed out that the weakest part of the Liberal party organization was in voter
registration.170 The committee noted that it was impossible for one agent to register every
voter in the entire town, and that it was instead necessary for each Parliamentary division
to see to registration within their own districts. Further, the committee claimed that the
Conservative party made use of a more centralized power structure than did the Liberal
party, and that it was that centralized power structure that had allowed the Conservative
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party to make such significant gains in 1886.171 The organizational troubles of the Liberal
party were already evident to them during the 1886 election, as the correspondent from
the Derby Daily Telegraph pointed out. He noted that the party organization was not
what it needed to be in 1885, but that some improvement had been made going into the
1886 election.172 However, even if this prediction of improved party organization had
proven true, it likely would not have saved the Liberal party, as they had attached
themselves to an extremely unpopular policy as their main platform in the 1886 election.
It was the Irish Home Rule movement that was perhaps the largest indicator of the
Liberal party’s decline in the latter years of the nineteenth century leading to the election
of 1886. While the Home Rule movement first emerged in the 1870s, it was not until
after the enfranchisement of the rural working-class in 1884 that it became a pressing
concern for British parliament.173 Gladstone came out publicly in favor of Home Rule in
1885, a move that allowed British parliament to maintain supremacy in the Home Rule
question by controlling the debate over the question, but forced the Liberal party to
become dependent upon Irish Nationalist MPs to maintain their power in government.174
The reason for the Liberal party’s dependence on the Irish Nationalists to maintain power
was the disappointing electoral returns for Liberal party candidates between 1874 and
1885. During this period, there was intense criticism of the NLF’s organizational
methods, with some critics like John Morley MP claiming that the NLF degraded British
politics to the American style “democracy” of machine politics.175 With some in the

“Leeds United Liberal Association,” The Leeds Mercury, 17 March 1888.
“The Derby Daily Telegraph,” The Derby Daily Telegraph, 8 July 1886.
173
Porritt, "Irish Home Rule Bill," 300.
174
Porritt, “Irish Home Rule Bill,” 301-3.
175
“Liberal Conference at Leeds.” Northern Echo, 18 October 1883.
171
172

46

Liberal party distrustful of the NLF, the party lacked sufficient organization to effectively
counter Conservative efforts to increase their standing in the cities and boroughs. This
situation was made worse by the uncertainty over Gladstone’s future in politics, with
some expecting him to retire as leader of the Liberal party. When it became clear that
Gladstone did not yet intend to retire, things did not improve as Gladstone’s Midlothian
campaign steered the Liberal party towards policy that was hitherto unfamiliar for them.
Gladstone spoke extensively during this campaign, appealing to the religious sensibilities
of the British electorate in decrying atrocities in Bulgaria and calling for British
intervention against the Turks.176 This change to Liberal policy caused the Liberal party
to lose seats over the following elections, including the 1885 general election, the first
after the Third Reform Act. Although the Liberal party remained the largest part in
Parliament following the election, with 333 seats to the Conservative party’s 251 seats,
the Irish National party led by Charles Parnell won 86 seats, more than enough to shift
the balance of power. Parnell initially the Parnellites planned to return the Conservative
party to power, but when Gladstone’s son leaked his father’s intention to introduce an
Irish Home Rule measure in Parliament the Irish Nationalists were persuaded to form a
coalition with the Liberal party and keep them in power.177 According to the Nottingham
Evening Post it was Gladstone’s insistence on Irish Home Rule despite domestic
opposition in England that led to Mr. Chamberlain and several of his associates leaving
the Liberal Party and forming the Liberal Unionist Party. Chamberlain and his followers
needed an efficient organization to be effective as a party and to maintain independence
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from the Conservative Party.178 This split, however, forced Chamberlain into an alliance
with the Conservative party leadership.179 According to Lubenow, it is in the split
between the Gladstonian faction of the Liberal party and the Liberal Unionists under
Chamberlain and Goschen that the electoral sociological explanation of the Conservative
ascendancy is most obvious. Lubenow contended that for the most part, the split between
Gladstonians and Liberal Unionists came down to self-interest. The Gladstonian faction
maintained majorities in all sectors of the Liberal party, suggesting that it was political
rather than social issues that caused the disintegration of the liberal party.180 Of these
political reasons, the most pressing was the ideological difference between Gladstonians
and the Whigs who seceded from the party in 1886. These Whigs, who had long been
considered the more conservative branch of the Liberal party, could not support
Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule measure and thus felt they had no choice but to join the
Liberal Unionist cause.181 The Whigs were more likely to be middle-class and Anglican
than the more radical members of the Liberal party who remained with Gladstone. For
them, the Irish Home Rule issue was an attack on the Empire, and an attack on property.
Land reform in Ireland was a major component of Irish Home Rule, and many Whigs felt
threatened by the prospect of Irish landlords being forced to sell their land.182
The largest impact of this split between the Liberal party and the Liberal
Unionists was to make it easier for the Conservative party to take control of the
government. The election of 1886 saw more Liberal Unionists stand for election in rural
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districts, with the Liberal Unionist candidates more closely resemble the Conservative
party than their erstwhile Liberal party colleagues on the issue of Irish Home Rule.183
While this could be seen as an indication that the Liberal party split over Home Rule was
responsible for the Conservative ascendancy, a better explanation is that the Conservative
party efforts to appeal to the middle-class over issues of Empire and property rights
sufficiently swayed public opinion enough to make winning an election as a supporter of
Irish Home Rule a daunting task in many districts. While it cannot be denied that a
Liberal candidate won election in 192 districts, it must not be overlooked that the Liberal
lost 127 seats from the 1885 election.184 This shows that the Irish Home Rule movement
was sufficiently unpopular to cost the Liberal party the election. While the Conservative
party and the Liberal Unionists did not share an ideological framework, their shared
opposition to Irish Home Rule was enough common ground to allow a tenuous alliance,
as the largest source of contention within the ranks of the Liberal party and the Liberal
Unionists was the opposition of the Liberal Unionist faction to the adoption of Irish
Home Rule as official party policy.185
The trend of defections from the Liberal party to the Liberal Unionists was not
only something seen among the ranks of parliament; nor was it a movement that was only
caused by the alienation engendered by the Irish Home Rule crisis. Many rural workingclass voters, newly enfranchised by the Third Reform Act, decided to support the
Conservative party rather than the seemingly more fitting Liberal party. This influx of
working-class support for the Conservative party was caused by a conscious effort by the
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Conservative party’s political organization to appeal to the working-class by identifying
themselves with working-class urban culture and presenting the Conservative party as the
defender of that culture.186
As has been stated before, the implementation of the Third Reform Acts caused
Gladstone to introduce Irish Home Rule as an official policy of the Liberal party. The
1885 election saw the Liberal party lose seats to the Conservatives and become
dependent on the Irish Nationalists to remain the governing party. The ideological
opposition to Irish Home Rule made it easier for Liberal Unionists to form a tenuous
alliance with the Conservative party.187 This alliance between the two parties also made it
easier for the working-class to support the Conservative party, as it no longer was
apparent that the Liberal party was the party that best represented their interests. As such,
working-class conservatism played a significant role in the Conservative party’s success
in the late-Victorian period.188 To gain the support of those working-class voters the
Conservative party deliberately associated themselves with aspects of urban society like
the pub, racing, and football to distinguish themselves from the moral reforming Liberal
party.189 This was done through the founding of political clubs, which put as much
emphasis on organizing parties and socials as they did on organizing voter registration
drives.190 Doing this ingratiated the Conservative party with the newly enfranchised
urban working-class electorate, while gradually familiarizing them with political
organization and participation. Perhaps the most important aspect of this campaign to
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gain the support of the urban working-class was the Conservative party’s defense of the
drink. Working-class identity was closely associated with the pub, and as such their
politics revolved heavily around the ‘beer barrel.’191 While the Liberal party was
dedicated to its ‘crusade against sin,’ the Conservative party dedicated itself to defense of
drink and popular sport, elements which were vital to the identity of the urban workingclass.192
In summation, the Liberal party experienced a significant decline in the final two
decades of the Victorian period. This decline, and the ultimate schism of the party caused
by Gladstone’s support of Irish Home Rule played a large role in the Conservative
ascendancy from 1886-1906. Although it was the Irish Home Rule Crisis that caused the
Liberal party schism, there were already tensions within the party prior to 1886. Despite
continuing to maintain the power in the government, the Liberal party had been
increasing unpopular during the 1870s and 1880s as they became more entrenched with
the faddists; single-issue pressure groups who used their influence to halt progress in
Parliament until their pet issues were acted upon. This inability to enact legislation
because of partisan maneuvering led to the distrust of party politics for fear that they
would become similar to the “wire-pulling” machine politics of the American style. This
fear of the Liberal party organization becoming nothing more than machine politics left
the Liberal party unprepared for new electoral realities, and the Conservative party was
able to use their centralized party organization to increased registration and persuade
significant numbers of the agricultural working-class to vote for Conservative candidates.
This was more easily done because of Gladstone’s insistence on Irish Home Rule. In a
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period with a rising nationalistic mood and heightened pride in the Empire, Gladstone’s
advocacy of Home Rule seemed like an affront the Englishness, and thus made support of
Home Rule unpalatable for many. This feeling was not limited to just British voters, as
many Liberal MPs were unable to support Gladstone in his crusade for Irish Home and
abandoned the party for the Liberal Unionist camp rather than compromise their beliefs
about the Empire.
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CHAPTER IV

POPULAR OPINION AND THE IRISH HOME RULES CRISIS

The Irish Home Rule Crisis was perhaps the most pressing and contentious
political crisis of the late-Victorian period. Although the desire by some for Irish Home
Rule had been present almost from the beginning of unification with Britain, the Irish
Home Rule Movement did not reach zenith until the late nineteenth century with the
growth of Irish national sentiment. The growth of this nationalistic sentiment in turn
fueled the development of a political party dedicated to Irish Home Rule. This dedication
can be seen in the January 1886 meeting of the Irish Parliamentary Party, in which
members met to affirm their belief in legislative rights for Ireland, and to thank T.P.
O’Connor for organizing Irish voters in Great Britain for their cause.193 Further, the
extension of working class enfranchisement into the counties and the parliamentary seat
redistribution of the Third Reform Act forced the Irish Home Rule issue into the forefront
of British politics, as the democratization of Ireland’s boroughs and cities meant that
from 1884, 80 percent of Irish MPs were supporters of Irish Home Rule.194 It was this
party, led by Charles Stewart Parnell that the Liberal party under the leadership of
William Ewart Gladstone sought a coalition with to maintain control of government. The
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growth of Parnell’s party, the Irish National Party, was spurred in part by the resurgence
of Irish national identity, as evidenced by an increased interest in the Irish language, Irish
literature and music, and traditional Irish culture.195 This Gaelic revival was responsible
for the Irish coming to see themselves as culturally distinct from the rest of Britain.196 As
one writer notes in Freeman’s Journal and Daily Commercial Advertiser the “knowledge
of the Irish language…ought to be the first object of an Irish Nationalists young
ambition.”197 This cultural nationalism began to take root in the Irish youth in the last two
decades of the nineteenth centuries and was seen as a spiritual successor to the Young
Ireland movement.198 The Gaelic League, which developed out of the Gaelic revival was
an effort to restore and cultivate the Irish language, which by the late nineteenth century
was dying out; only being spoken in a few districts throughout Ireland.199 The Gaelic
Athletic Association (GAA) also sought to promote Irish culture, by encouraging Irish
youth to participate in traditional Irish sport, such as football, hammer throw, hurling, and
camogie.200 These two organizations were representative of the cultural nationalism in
Ireland at the time, with the GAA calling traditional English games such as lawn tennis
and cricket alien, and the Gaelic League referring to those indifferent about the Irish
language “West Britons.”201 This cultural nationalism was a response to British thought
in the late nineteenth century. The Social-Darwinist, racist, nativist thought viewed the
Irish as an “inferior, simian-featured, irresponsible, irrational, and emotional subspecies
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incapable of managing their own affairs.”202 Out of this racist British ideology came the
Irish desire to prove their own cultural distinctiveness.203
In the late Victorian period, after the passage of the Third Reform Act, the Irish
Home Rule Crisis became one of national significance. It was during this period that
politics became more democratic, both in England and the “Celtic fringe” of Ireland,
Scotland, and Wales. As such, there was more of a need to appeal to the desires of the
working classes. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century Britain was
experiencing a prolonged economic decline and voters in Scotland and Wales were more
concerned with bread-and-butter issues than with matters of Ireland and the empire. The
result of this was the regionalization of politics in Britain, with the Conservative and
Liberal parties dominating England and the “Celtic fringe,” respectively.204 Despite this
attempt to appeal to the desires of the electorate however, the Liberal party was divided
over the matter of Home Rule, with a faction breaking away and forming the Liberal
Unionist party over the matter of Ireland remaining a fully incorporated part of the United
Kingdom. Furthermore, the Irish Home Rule Crisis highlights the new nature of popular
politics in the two decades following the passage of the Third Reform Act. It was at this
time that politics in Britain were become more, rather than less, populist as the two major
parties struggled to grasp the new challenges of mass politics. By necessity, politicians
had to bow to electoral logic, and cater to the measures that their constituencies found
important.205
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Though the union of 1801 had brought Ireland into a political union with the
United Kingdom, it was never fully integrated into the British system.206 The British
government encouraged Ireland to expand its agricultural production, but did little to
address the grievances of Irish farmers such as continually increasing rents and the
inability of Irish tenant farmers to rise above the system of landlordism and own the land
they worked.207 Furthermore, the British did little to ease the tensions between Catholics
and Protestants in Ireland. A Catholic Emancipation Bill was passed in 1828, giving all
Catholics in Britain the right to vote in general elections and to hold seats in Parliament.
Although the majority of the Irish population was Catholic, the Catholic emancipation
actually decreased the size of the Irish electorate, as an accompanying parliamentary bill
increased the property requirements from the franchise from two pounds to ten pounds in
Ireland.208 The discontent of the Irish over the perceived cultural and economic
indifference of the British government allowed violent radical groups, such as the Fenian
Brotherhood to take root in Ireland, protesting rural rents and the religious tithes.209
Despite efforts of the Gladstone government to mitigate the influence of the Fenian
Brotherhood through conciliation, fifty-nine Irish constituencies returned Home Rule
MPs, and advocated for a return of the Irish parliament.210 Efforts to conciliate Ireland
failed, and the nation was soon polarized between the Catholic-Nationalist majority, and
the Protestant minority in Ulster who wished to remain in the Union. Once given the
vote, and allowed to sit in Parliament, the Irish Catholics formed the Home Rule Party,
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advocating for Irish self-government. After 1885 this party held to balance of power in
the House of Commons, and forced a coalition with the Liberal government, as the
number of Liberal party MPs was not sufficient to maintain a majority had Parnell chosen
to align his party with the Conservatives, as had been the plan prior to Gladstone
supporting Home Rule.211
The Irish question was the predominating issue in British politics in the final two
decades of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century.212 In
fact, the issue of Home Rule did more to define the identities of the major political parties
of the late Victorian period than any other issue.213 It is during this period that the issue of
Irish Home Rule was taken up by the Liberal party under Gladstone in an attempt to unify
the party.214 Gladstone believed that the Liberal Party was close to fracture and that the
call to action provided by the issue of Home Rule would deliver the necessary
momentum to energize the party and keep all its constituent parts together.215 The Liberal
politician Chamberlain wrote that Gladstone:
Did not conceal that his present interest was in the Irish question, and he
seemed to think that a policy for dealing with it might be found which would
unite us all and which would necessarily throw into the background those
minor points of difference about the schools and small holdings which
threated to drive the Whigs into the arms of the Tories or into retirement.216
Hamer argues that Gladstone’s plan to unify the party through taking up the issue of the
Irish question backfired however; one third of Liberal MPs rebelled in 1886, forming the
Liberal Unionist Party over their opposition to Gladstone and Irish Home Rule.217 Chief
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among their criticisms of Gladstone was that “Ireland blocks the way” of progress. The
Liberal Unionists believed that Gladstone had become obsessed with the idea of Irish
Home Rule, and that because of that obsession, domestic politics were suffering.218 The
deep divisions between the Gladstonian Liberals and Liberal Unionists over the issue of
Home Rule was one of the main causes of the Liberal loss of power after 1885.219
The Conservatives were in power from 1886-1906 and believed that there could
be no middle ground on the issue of Home Rule. They believed that there could only be
government from Westminster, or government from Dublin.220 Conservative sentiment
was that the Irish would not be content with anything less than full independence.221
Far from a monolithic face of support however, the Irish were as equally divided
over the issue of Home Rule as the British. Many Irish Protestants in the north of Ireland
supported continuing close ties with Westminster. Many of these supporters of the union
were descended from the English conquerors of Ireland, and their opposition to Home
Rule fits into a broader imperial mindset best summed up in the question “How can the
British hope to hold India if they cannot even hold Ireland?”222 These supporters of union
were so determined to prevent Home Rule that they threatened to resort to violence
should Parliament pass and enforce a Home Rule Bill.223 As Conservative MP Lord
Randolph Churchill wrote: “Ulster will fight; Ulster will be right.”224

Hamer, “The Irish Question,” 521.
Hamer, “The Irish Question,” 524.
220
Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 32-33.
221
Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 33.
222
Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 33.
223
Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 32.
224
Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 32.
218
219

58

Many Irish citizens also opposed Home Rule on the grounds that it was based on
political despotism.225 Many Irish people viewed their homeland as a subjugated colony
of England.226 They believed that the British introduced oppressive political structures
onto the Irish to promote English interests over the interests of the Irish.227 These Irish
citizens viewed Ireland as a nation under occupation, and obeisance to Home Rule would
validate their servitude.228 This sentiment gave rise to the nationalist movement that
eventually pushed for full Irish independence in the early twentieth century.229
Perhaps the largest impact of the Irish Home Rule Crisis upon British politics in
the late-Victorian period was the division and decline of the Liberal party. According to
the historian W.C. Lubenow, the class alignment of the two major political parties was
the most striking feature of late-Victorian politics. As such, the Liberal Unionist party
formed as a halfway-house for middle-class Liberals to transition to the Conservative
party as they could no longer support Gladstone over the matter of Irish Home Rule.230
While Gladstone’s contemporaries favored a social conflict theory approach when
examining the reasons for the defection to the Liberal Unionist Party, more recent
scholarship from Biagini, Lawrence, and Lubenow has tended to prefer a more political
rather than societal explanation. Eugenio Biagini argues that the Liberal party split was
caused wholly by Gladstone’s adoption of the Irish Home Rule cause, going so far as to
claim it is generally regarded as one of his worst mistakes. He continues that Home Rule
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was not a policy that was adopted rationally after considering all possible alternatives, but
rather that it was an aging leader’s personal obsession. Biagini echoes T. W. Heyk’s
sentiments claiming that his support of Irish Home Rule split the party and cost him the
support of the working-class.231 Contrary to Biagini and Heyk, Stephen Lee argues that
the Liberal party schism was caused by Gladstone’s management of the party rather than
any ideological differences. According to Lee, Gladstone introduced the Irish Home Rule
measure to unify the party around himself and thwart the ascendance of Chamberlain and
his Radical policies.232 However, the rapid adoption of Radical policies following the
departure of the Liberal Unionists would seem to disprove this argument. Instead,
Lawrence argues that the Irish Home Rule crisis was the cause of the Liberal party split,
with Liberal Unionists unable to support Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule measure, and the
Gladstonian hardliners refusing to move off Irish Home Rule as their first priority.233
While there was a clear split in the Liberal party over the issue of Irish Home Rule, it is
difficult to find a vote in which social reasons were the cause of the split. Instead, the
split was over political reasons. Lubenow argues that Gladstone controlled the majority
of all social classes represented by the Liberal party of the time, suggesting that political
rather than social reasons were the cause of the Liberal Party split.234 This shows that
social differences are not what separated the Liberal party in 1886. Rather it was political
issues, which were the effects of the Third Reform Act.
Before a discussion of the effects of the Liberal party split can be discussed at
length, there must first be an exploration of the cause for the split and Gladstone’s
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adamant support of Irish Home Rule. Lee argues that Gladstone supported Irish Home
Rule because he desired to reclaim the reforming initiative from the Conservative party
but did not wish to tackle the social reform measures that were being put forward by
Chamberlain and the Radical wing of the party. Lee continues, claiming that Gladstone
was troubled by what he saw as the growing factionalism of the Liberal party, and desired
to embrace a major national issue in the hopes that it would unify the Liberal party.235
However, while Gladstone’s distress over factionalism may be well-documented, his lack
of desire to tackle Radical social reforms should not be accepted as his reason for
supporting Irish Home Rule because in the years following the split the Liberal party
adopted those radical measures.236 According to Jason Belcher, Home Rule support
would not imply independence from Britain but did allow Ireland to control a greater
measure of its own affairs, including gaining a stronger voice in the British government.
Meanwhile, the present state of devolution did not allow for Irish politicians to exert an
active voice in parliamentary proceedings. Gladstone viewed devolution as beneficial to
British Parliament because it meant that he could represent Irish interests by allowing
them self-governance while simultaneously “cleansing” the House of Commons from an
unstable element of the Irish Nationalists.237
Furthermore, and perhaps as a result of this Liberal party split, the two major
political parties became much more regional parties than had previously been the case.
Following the 1886 Irish Home Rule Crisis and Liberal party split, the Liberal party was
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strongest in Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and major industrial areas of England, with the
Conservative party stronghold being in England. This Conservative party hold over
England was further strengthened by the additional of the Unionist caucus of the Liberal
party joining them in all but name. The Aberdeen Journal predicted this alliances gave
the Conservative bloc a majority of 118 seats, with the Gladstonian Liberals and Irish
Nationalists only able to muster 282 seats.238 The Ipswich Journal showed similar results
with four English and one Welsh seats at Staffordshire, King’s County, Yorkshire, Down,
and Carnarvonshire flipping from the Liberal party to either the Conservatives or
Unionists.239 The Pall Mall Gazette enforced this claim by showing that of the 407 seats
won by a Liberal or Unionist candidates in England, Scotland, and Wales, the Unionists
candidates were victorious in 63 percent of cases despite winning the majority of those
seats in both Wales and Scotland.240 This trend follows earlier observations that the
Conservative party was more dominant among the landed classes, and the Liberal party
held sway among the working classes. However, due to the Conservative party’s appeal
to Empire, and Chamberlain’s defection on the issue of Irish Home Rule, the 1886
election became more of an election of the dominant English Conservative majority
against the Liberal strongholds in urban centers and Wales and the Irish Nationalists in
Ireland, with the exception of Ulster. This is evidenced by the following map.241
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The result of the Irish Home Rule crisis and the consequent political realignment was a
contributing factor in the decline of the Liberal party and the subsequent Conservative
ascendancy of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods. This realignment was enabled
by the Third Reform Act, which created the circumstances necessary for the Liberal party
split. By expanding the electorate, the Third Reform Act shrank the differences between
the Conservative and Liberal parties, makes it easier for Liberals to defect first to the
Liberal Unionist faction, and then ultimately to the Conservative party.243
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Furthermore, the Third Reform Act had another, longer lasting impact on the
execution of politics in the years following the Irish Home Rule Crisis in 1886. In the
earlier Victorian period canvassing for jobs, commonly referred to as “jobbing” was not
seen as political corruption in Ireland but rather part of the political culture. However,
Irish Nationalists claimed that jobbing was a form of political prostitution and that the
Act of Union only passed in Ireland because of promises of government favors.244 Those
Irish Nationalists, led by Parnell, gained increased influence in Parliament following the
Third Reform Act, as increased enfranchisement in Ireland and the redistribution of seats
meant the return of more Nationalist MPs. In the early 1880s jobbing took place amongst
Irish MPs but faced criticism from anti-Parnellites. After the Third Reform Act and the
Irish Home Rule Crisis this patronage dried up as the newly elected Unionist government
was unsympathetic to Nationalist concerns.245 However, during the Gladstone ministry of
1892-5 there was more evidence of Nationalist MPs participating in patronage,
suggesting that their pledge not to do so was not taken seriously when confronted with
the opportunity for advancement by a favorable government.246 This provides further
evidence to the claim that the Third Reform Act and Irish Home Rule Crisis created a
new political system that was regional in nature. In the years preceding the Home Rule
crisis, jobbing was commonplace, but then dried up in the years following the election of
1886. While this could simply be written off as Nationalist MPs taking their oath not to
accept patronage more seriously, the fact that jobbing resurfaces in the period 1892-1895
suggests that it was instead the new, regional focus of politics that was to blame. The
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dominant Conservative and Unionist government had no interest in the Nationalist
concerns, and therefore did not reward them with jobs.
The Third Reform Act played a final, major role in the development of the Irish
Home Rule Crisis. In the years before the extension of the franchise, British politics had
been conducted in a manner that valued “man over measure.” The result of this shift was
that the increased democratization of British politics created an environment in which
Irish Home Rule became an important electoral issue. Candidates standing for election
representing the Conservative party campaigned on the notion of Empire, while Liberal
party candidates instead campaigned on giving Ireland the freedom to manage their own
affairs internally.
For the Liberal party, the concept of popular liberalism had for a while been about
democracy. For them, Home Rule was a natural extension of that democracy into
Ireland.247 Because of the franchise extension in 1867, and again in 1884-5, the
traditional mode of politics gave way to the advent of the caucus. One the one hand it was
argued that the caucus diminished politics by trading educated voters for the uninformed
masses blindly following the party line, but on the other the caucus allowed for more
effective party organization and mobilization of voters.248 This new caucus model of
politics brought the issue of Irish Home Rule to the forefront of British politics. This
sentiment is echoed in a report by the Aberdeen Weekly Journal from June 1887, which
saw Gladstone delivered a four and a half hour speech championing Irish Home Rule,
and further informed readers of the efforts of the Liberal caucus in disrupting the efforts
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of the Conservative and Unionist meetings.249 This effort to disrupt the meetings of the
opposition was a demonstration of the power of the caucus in politics following the
passage of the Third Reform Act. The NLF was among the major Liberal party
organization of the time, and was ultimately the first instance that rank-and-file party
members had an opportunity to challenge party leadership over the policy and priorities
of the party. The NLF did not challenge Gladstone over the issue of Irish Home Rule
though. Instead, they stuck to Gladstone’s policy with almost religious zeal despite the
ultimate electoral unpopularity of the Home Rule proposal.250
The Liberal party was not the only party to have an effective organization
advocating for Irish Home Rule in the 1880s. The Irish National League was the first
mass organization for the Irish Nationalists and drew on long Irish tradition by appealing
to county conventions for political support. By this method the INL was able to transform
the Home Rule movement in Ireland into a well-knit, modern political party.251 It was
through the efforts of the INL mobilizing newly enfranchised voters in Ireland that the
Home Rule movement was able to first elect MPs to represent them in Westminster. As
reported in the Leeds Mercury, the INL celebrated electoral success in the 1885 election
by gaining two hard-fought seats and forcing the Nationalists in Ulster into an alliance
with the Irish Parliamentary party. According to John Dillon, the result of this victory
was to eliminate divisions within the Irish Home Rule movement in Ireland, leaving, as
John Dillon put it, “There would now be in Ireland only the Irish party and the
English.”252 This victory was claimed to be the largest victory in Irish politics since the
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days of Grattan, and that the Liberal party leader, who championed Home Rule would
look to the unanimity of Ireland as his justification.253
The caucus politics model created by the Third Reform Act had the result of
leaving political organizations, especially the NLF in charge of shaping party policy over
the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century. These party machines did much to
increase democratic activity in Britain and Ireland, and by the nature of their operation
moved the policy of their respective political parties more in line with the opinion of their
rank-and-file members.254
In summation, the Third Reform Act had several impacts on British politics that
were brought to greater prominence as a result of the Irish Home Rule Crisis. The Third
Reform Act brought greater enfranchisement for the working classes and also drastically
redistributed parliamentary seats, instituting the modern single-member constituency.
This had the effect of creating a system in which candidates standing for election then
had to appeal more directly to the desires of their constituencies. The consequence of this
political shift was the regionalization of the Conservative and Liberal parties into
England and the Celtic fringe respectively. Although the Liberal party did maintain some
strength in the industrialized areas of England, it largely lost numbers in the nation as a
whole, as the conservative party was more efficiently able to appeal to the working-class
desire to maintain the Empire than was the Liberal party at appealing to the moral outrage
of denying Ireland the right to govern themselves. Furthermore, the Third Reform Act
was at least partially responsible for the Liberal party split of 1886 at the height of the
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Irish Home Rule Crisis. The efforts to appeal to an increased electorate had the effect of
bringing the Conservative and Liberal parties closer together ideologically, which made it
easier for the disillusioned Liberals to defect first to the Liberal Union party, and then
later to the Conservative party. This ease of defection was especially seen in 1886, when
Gladstone’s insistence on pressing the Home Rule issue became inconvenient for recently
elected MPs. More Liberal MPs were in seats considered to be vulnerable than were their
Conservative counterparts and many were hesitant to stand for election again so soon
after the 1885 election. As a result, many of those recently elected, vulnerable Liberal
MPs chose to defect to the Unionist cause, as it was in their political best interest. Finally,
the Third Reform Act created a political system in which political parties were more
dependent on effective organization for electoral success. As a result of the redistribution
of seats in parliament and the extension of the franchise, this meant that the Irish MPs
held the balance of power in Parliament. Irish Home Rule was thrust to the fore of British
politics by these political machines, which leveraged popular democratic sentiment,
especially in Ireland, for the creation of Home Rule measures. The importance of this
development is two-fold. First, it saw the evolution of British politics from a game of
“man over measures” in which MPs were elected based on their personal integrity to a
system in which candidates had to pay more attention to the opinions of their people.
Second, the development of the caucus finally gave rank-and-file party members an
opportunity to shape party policy rather than accept the party line dictated to them by the
party elites. Although the NLF initially followed Gladstone’s policy religiously, by the
1890s it was in a position to dictate party policy. These developments were in line with

68

the longstanding ideals of popular democracy that were responsible for the passage of the
Third Reform Act.
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CHAPTER V

SOCIOPOLITICAL PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE THIRD REFORM ACT

Political pressure groups have long been a part of British politics. From the very
beginning of Victoria’s reign these groups have pressured the government for greater
power, more representation in government, or for government action in favor of some
social or political cause they championed. Patricia Hollis argues that by 1867 pressure
groups had become a necessary aid to government which evidenced healthy public
concern, expanded the arena of government and widened access to government.255 In his
work on the middle-class Radical experience Paul Adelman shows the power of pressure
groups through the campaigns of the Nonconformist National Education League.
Adelman asserts that the methods of the Nonconformist pressure group were too
antagonistic and contributed at least in small part to the Liberal party defeat in the 1874
election.256 Stephen J. Lee states that Evangelical and Dissenting pressure groups had
petitioned Whig MPs for reform and had collaborated with them in executing those
reforms in the 1830s, but that the willingness of Whigs to impose repressive measures
against Chartist activity provoked working-class hostility, and alienated Evangelicals and
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Dissenters to the extent that many of them voted Conservative in 1841.257 Pressure
groups occupied a place of extreme importance in Victorian politics, often acting as a
guiding force for party policy. Indeed, this can be seen from the earliest days of
Victoria’s reign, with the publication of the People’s Charter in 1838. This charter, the
first to call for widespread electoral reform, demanded the franchise be extended to
universal manhood suffrage, institute the secret ballot, eliminate property requirement for
MPs and ensure their payment, redistribute seats in Parliament, and hold annual
Parliamentary elections.258 Although the Chartist movement did not yield immediate
results in the 1830 or 1840s, it did set a precedent for political and social groups to
pressure the government to address their concerns. Through continued pressure on
Parliament throughout the Victorian period, the Chartists and their successors ultimately
achieved most of the demands set forth in the People’s Charter. According to Lee, the
property qualification for MPs was abolished in 1859, the secret ballot was introduced in
1872, MPs were paid a salary beginning in 1911, and the franchise acts of 1918 and 1928
made suffrage universal and made adjustments for more equal electoral districts. Thus, in
less than a century from its introduction almost all demands of the People’s Charter had
been met.259
Over the course of the Victorian period, political and social pressure groups
became more influential on the course of parliamentary politics. Following the franchise
expansion of the Second Reform Act, and especially following the franchise reform and
redistribution of the Third Reform Act in the 1880s, these political pressure groups
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became a much more prevalent player on the political landscape. Certain reforms and
ideological views of these pressure groups became ingrained in the political platforms of
the two major political parties of the time, especially for the Liberal party.260 Still more of
those groups pressured Parliament from the outside, urging action on measures to bring
Britain more in line with their visions of the ideal.
In this chapter, the focus will be placed on sociopolitical pressure groups urging
change both domestically and throughout the wider Empire. During this period, the
pressure groups most prevalent are those in the realm of religious reform and moral
issues. On the liberal side of politics were those pressing for the disestablishment,
education reform, and temperance. Additionally, those who sought to end or curtail
Britain’s imperial efforts, especially around the Boer War at the close of the nineteenth
century, turned to the Liberal Party. Conversely, those pressure groups which identified
with the conservative side of politics were likely to push for a greater expansion of the
Empire. These conservative pressure groups were also likely to support what has been
seen as the traditional idea of Britishness. They fought against the disestablishment of the
Church and attempts by the Liberal party to control the morality of the British people. As
such, they clung to their defense of the drink and popular entertainment such as football.
As Jon Lawrence points out, the defense of “the pleasures of the people,” especially the
drink and sport were a central part of Tory electoral strategy. In his analysis of politics in
Wolverhampton Lawrence argues:
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certainly it was only when the drink issue came to the fore that Conservatives
were able to win significant support from voters in the depressed and
impoverished wards of the ‘east end.’…The strong connections between
Wolverhampton Toryism and professional sports carried similar overtones,
and culminates in the Tory stranglehold over the affairs of Wolverhampton
Wanderers football club in the 1890s, and the high profile manipulation of
the team (and its players) in the Tory cause at Parliamentary elections.261
Thus, the Conservative party used their connection to, and defense of, elements of
popular entertainment to endear themselves to the working-class and gain sufficient
support to take seats from Liberal candidates.
In the final two decades of the Victorian era, following the ratification of the
Third Reform Act, the political climate was such that sociopolitical pressure groups were
able to have a much more prominent role in politics than had previously been the case.
This increased role in politics is demonstrated in two key ways: the first being the
incorporation of the demands of these groups into the political platforms of both the
Liberal and Conservative parties, and the second being the changed dialogue of
politicians in the years following 1885. It was during those years that party activism took
hold and politicians made a more concerted effort to appeal to the desires of their
constituents to ensure victory in an era of single-member constituencies.262
Paul Adelman claims that following the general election the Liberal party became
more, rather than less radical. He argues that this is demonstrated by the ‘Newcastle
Programme’ of 1891, which consisted of myriad radical demands such as Irish Home
Rule, Welsh disestablishment, land, tax, and local government reforms, and reduction of
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the Lords’ powers, all of which were implemented due to pressure from without the
party.263 Here Adelman shows that political pressure groups wield sufficient power to
directly influence party politics.
Much like Adelman, Michael Barker sees a prominent role for political pressure
groups in the development of politics in late Victorian Britain. In his work detailing the
relationship between Gladstone and Radical politics, Barker gives a significant discussion
over the role of Nonconformist pressure groups on the Liberal party. According to
Barker, the Nonconformists were instrumental in the push for education reform and it
was their twin belief in public control of schools and nondenominational teaching that
became key to the Liberal party’s policy regarding religion and education. Barker
continues by claiming that the NLF was dominated by Nonconformists by June 1891, and
that any reforms in the realms of education was naturally be shaped the influence of the
Nonconformists.264
Rohan McWilliam takes a similar view of the impact of popular pressure groups.
In quoting the work of John Vincent, he argues that liberalism was nothing without the
single-issue interest groups (often called faddists) pushing forward the program of reform
around the figure of Gladstone.265 Thus, McWilliam argues that while Gladstone was
responsible in part for empowering the popular pressure groups, they were in turn
responsible for giving him power to govern.
D G Wright takes a different perspective on the issue of radicalism and the impact
of political pressure groups. Wright does not see a significant change in the relationship

263

Adelman, Victorian Radicalism, 9.
Barker, Gladstone and Radicalism, 100-3.
265
Rohan McWilliam, Popular Politics in Nineteenth Century England (London: Routledge, 1998), 67-8.
264

74

between government and pressure groups in the years following the Third Reform Act.
Instead he argues that this trend could be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth
century, and even into the eighteenth century and the political agitation following in the
wake of the French Revolution.266
In his work on the temperance movement in Victorian Britain, Brian Howard Harrison
tends to agree with Wright’s assessment of the role of pressure groups. Although
Harrison’s analysis is limited in scope to just the temperance movement, he does show
that pressure groups played a significant role in British politics before the passage of the
Third Reform Act. According to Harrison:
The years 1871-2 mark a turning-point in temperance history. Politicians had
to grapple directly with the popular pressure group whose influence had been
mounting in the provinces since the 1830s…These years also saw an
important shift in party attitudes to the drink questions; in 1871-2 Gladstone’s
great administration was beginning to lose impetus, and enthusiasts for the
alleged ‘Conservative reaction’ magnified the government’s every mistake.267
Through this analysis Harrison shows that not only were popular pressure groups a
prominent part of politics in the years before the Third Reform Act, but rather that those
popular pressure groups were also capable of exerting enough influence to force action
on those issues, as Harrison explains that Gladstone introduced a bill addressing the drink
issue in the 1872 parliament.268
Agreeing with this sentiment, Andrew S Thompson wrote in 2000 that a more
nuanced approach should be taken to the matter of anti-imperialist sentiment in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to Thompson, anti-imperialism never
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gained more than a limited and conditional foothold in Britain in the years before 1914,
and that anti-imperialists did not call for the complete dismantling of the colonial system,
but rather the prevention of further territorial acquisition and the efficient government of
the Empire.269 Thompson does not see a significant impact on the growth of the antiimperialist movement coming from the Boer War, instead arguing that although antiimperialism did resurface around the turn of the twentieth century, the resurgence was not
large enough to have any measurable impact other than to disrupt the Edwardian Labour
movement.270 Thus, while Thompson accepts that there was an increase in antiimperialist sentiment in the aftermath of the Boer War, he rejects that the anti-imperialists
had an impact on British politics during the same period.
Although historical opinion seems to be divided on the impact of political
pressure groups in the years following the Third Reform Act, their impact must not be
overlooked. The twenty years following the Third Reform Act are commonly referred to
as the Conservative ascendancy and that rise to power was in large possible because of
the impact of social and political pressure groups. These groups heavily influenced the
platforms of both parties, with mixed results. The Conservative party was able to win
working-class support thanks in large part to their defense of “traditional” English values
such as the drink, the Church, and popular entertainment like football.271 This was a
direct response to the Liberal party becoming heavily involved with the moral reform
movement favored by pressure groups. Unfortunately for the Liberal party, this led to
their fall from grace following the Irish Home Rule Crisis.
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It cannot be denied that political and social pressure groups existed before the
Third Reform Act, and indeed even before the Second Reform Act. It can even be argued
that these pressure groups played some role on the development of politics in Victorian
Britain, as evidenced by the widespread demonstrations in Britain. According to
newspapers from the time, the summer of 1838 saw significant demonstrations in support
of the People’s Charter in major industrial cities such as London, Bath, Newcastle-uponTyne, as well as minor settlements like Trowbridge.272 However, this relatively high level
of political activity did not translate into action on the part of parliament. In 1842, a
petition of over three million signatures was presented to Parliament urging action in
favor of the People’s Charter and universal suffrage. This petition was ultimately ignored
by government though, as the Northern Star states:
Three and half millions have quietly, orderly, soberly, peaceably but firmly
asked of their rulers to do justice; and their rulers have turned a deaf ear to
that protest. Three and a half millions of people have asked permission to
detail their wrongs, and enforce their claims for RIGHT, and the 'House' has
resolved they should not be heard! Three and a half millions of the slaveclass have holden out the olive branch of peace to the enfranchised and
privileged classes and sought for a firm and compact union, on the principle
of EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW; and the enfranchised and privileged
have refused to enter into a treaty! The same class is to be a slave class still.
The mark and brand of inferiority is not to be removed. The assumption of
inferiority is still to be maintained. The people are not to be free.273

The failure of the Chartist movement despite such widespread support shows that
although political and social pressure groups were active in the years before the Third
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Reform Act, the political climate was not yet one in which the voice of the workingclasses was particularly valued, as the franchise was still limited to the middle-classes
following the Reform Act of 1832.
In the years following the ratification of the Third Reform Act, political and social
pressure groups had much more success petitioning government to address their
grievances. Education reform, namely the establishing of free education not dominated
by the Church of England in Britain, had been something desired by many groups such as
the National Education League and the Liberation Society since the mid-Victorian era.
Although the Education Act of 1870 did establish free elementary education in England
and Wales, it was not until 1885 that the cause of the Nonconformist Liberation Society
and National Education League was taken up by government. It was then that
Chamberlain’s Radical Programme came about, championing causes that were previously
only considered by fringe pressure groups.274 Indeed, the Liberation Society itself sees
the Third Reform Act as a watershed moment for the cause of free education and
disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of England. As the leaders of the
Liberation Society said in a meeting held 13 January 1885:
If an election was to take place by the unreformed constituencies still the
growth of the sentiment of the country on this question of religious equality
would have entitled the society to make this a question to be brought before
the Legislature. In the new constituencies voters would come in a manner
never before contemplated. Therefore. Whether the opinions of the society
were the opinions of the majority or not it was well that they should test what
is the opinion of the majority…If, as he believed, the great majority of the
popular forces throughout the country were in harmony with them, in
agreeing that religious equality is a sound principle, still more was it their
duty not to be hesitating, not to be timid, but to determine at the next election
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this great question should occupy its proper place in the Liberal
programme.275
This shows that the enfranchisement and redistribution provisions of the Third Reform
Act created a system in which the will of the majority was more important than it had
been in the years before its ratification.
This can also be seen through Chamberlain’s promise to introduce temperance
legislation into Parliament in 1886. The United Kingdom Alliance had been active in
Britain since the middle of the nineteenth century advocating for the institution of
legislation regulating the sale of alcohol throughout the nation. Following the franchise
reform and seat redistribution of the Third Reform Act, Chamberlain promised to
introduce legislation in favor of the temperance issue.276 Although Chamberlain claimed
he was not able to promise details of the form the bill was to take, he did promise that a
temperance bill would be introduced in the upcoming parliament, and that he would share
the details of said bill once they became available.
The fight over temperance can also be used to highlight the second major way the
Third Reform Act changed the way that sociopolitical pressure groups and the
government interacted with the people and with each other. It was in the years following
the Third Reform Act that political discourse became more democratic, with politicians
speaking more directly to the will of the people, abandoning the ‘man over measures’
form of politics that had been prevalent in earlier political eras. This can be seen in a
report of a Liberal Association meeting in which Mr. Hoare spoke directly about the
temperance issue. In this meeting, Mr. Hoare claimed that rather than outright abolition
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of alcohol he favored the local option, the transfer of authority over alcohol to locally
elected boards. He claimed that this should be enough to satisfy those in the Liberal party
who advocated strongest for temperance, and that such a move was necessary because
despite the relatively small percentage of the larger party that the temperance faction
made up, they were instrumental in deciding who stood for election in any given
constituency.277 This is further evidenced by a meeting held at Chester earlier in the
decade by Herbert Gladstone, MP. This meeting, organized by the United Kingdom
Alliance in support of James Tomkinson, the Liberal candidate for Eddisbury was meant
to show how the Liberal party supported the cause of temperance. At this meeting several
speakers including Gladstone, Wilfrid Lawson, MP Canon Baker, and James Tomkinson
himself extolled the virtues of the Liberal party. Lawson claimed that the Conservative
party felt that any temperance measures impeded upon the individual liberties of the
people, and as such would not support those measures as a party. Thus, according to
Lawson and the other speakers “The Liberal part alone supported temperance
legislation.”278 In this meeting the Liberal party spokesmen speak directly to supporters
of a major pressure group in Britain at the time and urge them to support the Liberal party
as they are the only party to take their concerns into account. This is a clear distinction
from earlier political discourse in which the major emphasis was placed on the personal
qualifications of candidates for Parliament and shows how the Third Reform Act creates
a political atmosphere in which candidates and political parties must be more active in
appealing to the will of their constituencies.
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In conclusion, the ratification of the Third Reform Act had significant impacts on
social and political pressure groups in the closing decades of the Victorian era. During
these years pressure groups were able to exert much more influence in government and
bring attention to and action for their causes in Parliament. This has been seen through
Chamberlain’s adoption of policies advocated by the Liberation Society and National
Education League in his Radical Programme. In the years before the Third Reform Act,
politicians did not have to show as much consideration for the will of the people, as
expressed through pressure groups. However, in a system in which only one member was
returned from each constituency, it became much more pressing to adhere to the wishes
of the voters. This resulted in a system in which pressure groups were able to exert more
influence in the shaping of policy.
The Third Reform Act also created a system in which those wishing to represent
the people in Parliament had to speak directly to the wishes of the majority. This had
previously not been the case, as men wishing to stand for election tended to instead extoll
their own virtues. After the franchise expansion and seat redistribution of 1884-5 this
system was no longer electorally viable. Again, with each constituency only returning
one member it was vital that those wishing to be elected appeal to popular opinion. Thus,
candidates spoke more openly on political issues, and associated themselves and their
parties with those issues.
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CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE THIRD REFORM ACT

Much like the social and economic pressure groups that came to exert significant
influence over government and popular opinion in the years following the passing of the
Third Reform Act, economic pressure groups were an important aspect of late-Victorian
politics.279 Several of these groups advocated for action from the government in many
arenas of public life that were similar to those of the social and political pressure groups,
albeit for different reasons. Among those causes taken up by both economic and
sociopolitical pressure groups was the cause of religious reform, which was important to
economic pressure groups, although their reason for wanting to see the disestablishment
of the Church of England was the abolition of the Church rate, which many viewed as an
unfair taxation rather than the issue of education reform called for by Radical
Nonconformists.280 Similarly, the debate over temperance adopted an economic tone
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when discussing specific legislation. This is especially true in 1890, as discussion of a
Drink Bill was taking place in Parliament. As one Radical newspaperman puts it:
For many weighty reasons the question is not one that can be decided offhand
by cut-and-dried resolutions passed at hastily-convened meetings. The
financial difficulties that surround it preclude precipitate treatment. There are
economic rights, quite apart from those real or supposed, of the ordinary
license-holders that must be duly considered. That, for instance, the rights of
mortgagees, which have always been dealt with tenderly by the law, and
which form so important a factor in the present licensing controversy: there is
no getting away from the fact that rights have been legally acquired, and as
such are entitled to legal protection.281

There were many in Britain who advocated against temperance reform as their ability to
sell liquor and other alcoholic beverages was their primary livelihood, there was also
those on the other side of the debate who advocated for tempered reform through the
local option, partly due to fears that any temperance bill would fail without such a
measure, as such a drastic measure would alienate those who depended on the urban
working-classes for electoral support. Such a move shows the level of influence that
economic pressure groups were able to exert over the government. This is demonstrated
in the case of the Trades Union Congress’ advocacy against the influx of immigrants in
the late 1890s. The TUC successfully lobbied Parliament to create commission to study
the effects of immigration and ultimately result in the Aliens Act of 1905 which
expanded the circumstances under which aliens could be denied entry into Britain.282
This can also be seen through pressure groups that were primarily concerned with
the influx of immigrant labor into the industrial centers of Britain in the closing decades
of the Victorian period. These pressure groups, primarily made up of urban working-class

“Drink Legislation,” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 11 May 1890.
B C Roberts, The Trades Union Congress, 1868-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958),
183.
281
282

83

men, sought government action to curtail the patterns of immigration, as they claimed
that it took jobs away from able-bodied British men. These sentiments were expressed at
an 1892 TUC meeting by Mr. J Wilson MP, the Chairman on the Parliamentary
Committee of the TUC. According to the Aberdeen Journal:
He afterwards spoke of the necessity for land reform and against foreign
immigration, stating that the door must be shut against the enormous
immigration of destitute aliens into this country. Briefly, these foreigners,
driven out of their own county or countries of their adoption, fled here, and
took work at any price. The tailoring and kindred trades, particularly in large
centres of population, had been practically ruined, until one ceased to wonder
why sweating flourished.283
This shows a clear link between the government, pressure groups, and the economy. The
Trades Union Congress, which was the largest trade union at the time, claiming to
represent over one and a quarter million workers, was openly advocating for a cessation
of foreign immigration with the aim of aiding British workers, and had support, as
indicated by Mr. Wilson’s comments, from some members of Parliament, particularly
Conservative MPs, for whom patriotic nationalism was a central ideological tenet.284
Perhaps the most significant impact of economic pressure groups on the political
landscape of the late Victorian period, however, was that of the debate over imperial
preference and tariff reform. It was here that several pressure groups converged over a
single issue, the matter of Britain’s faltering economy when compared with those of the
United States and Germany. Joseph Chamberlain, the erstwhile champion of the Radical
Programme introduced a plan of tariff reform and imperial preference in to Parliament in
the early twentieth century that was met with intense opposition from several sectors of
the population and from government itself. Although Chamberlain’s tariff reform
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campaign ultimately failed, it gave perhaps the greatest showcase of political pressure by
economic interests in the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods. It was roundly opposed
by those interests who supported free trade, which had been the status-quo since the
repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and ushered in the resurgence of the Liberal party in
1906.285 Thus, through the campaign to defeat Chamberlain’s tariff reform program,
economic pressure groups demonstrated that they were able to have an impactful
influence upon government.
This influence, and its impact, will be measured in two ways throughout this
chapter. First will be a discussion of the success these pressure groups had pressuring the
government to action in the years follow the implementation of the Third Reform Act.
The franchise expansion measures of the Third Reform Act created a greatly expanded
electorate, with the most significant gains coming in the counties. Naturally, this created
a more democratic electoral process, with the will of the majority becoming more readily
apparent. To remain electorally viable, the two major political parties had to appeal to
public opinion for support. It is here that it will be shown that pressure groups exerted
their greatest influence. Acting as agents for public opinion, these economic groups
pressured government for change. Eager to bolster their own power in Parliament, MPs
from both parties incorporated the desires of these groups into their political platforms in
election years and promised the change that the pressure groups sought. The second way
that the influence of economic pressure groups will be measured in this chapter is through
the changing dialogue of politicians themselves. In an era of democratic politics,
especially with a greatly expanded working-class electorate, it was necessary for MPs to
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change the ways in which they interacted with their constituencies. The days of ‘man
over measure’ politics were gone and in their place was a new system in which public
opinion ruled. Political dialogue of the late-Victorian period was characterized by direct
appeals to reform measures such as limits on immigration to protect working-class jobs in
Britain.286 In this manner the influence of economic pressure groups can be measured by
observing how their demands are incorporated into the speeches of MPs and candidates
standing for election in the years following the Third Reform Act. By combining these
two methods of measuring the success of economic pressure groups this chapter will
show that the Third Reform Act created a significant change in the relationship between
government and the people, creating a more democratic system.
Before a discussion of these economic pressure groups can take place however, it
is important to review the existing literature on the topic to gain an understanding of how
scholarship has developed in regard to it. Looking again to Adelman, one can see an
interpretation that points towards the Conservative party commitment to tariff reform as a
driving factor behind the Liberal party resurgence in 1906.287 However, Adelman does
not explicitly credit pressure groups for influencing either the Conservative party to
support tariff reform or the Liberal party to reject tariff reform in favor of free trade. He
does explain that the Liberal party favored free trade and an expansion of social reform
and its associated government spending, but again, there is no mention of pressure groups
being a factor in these developments.288 While it could be argued that Adelman implies
through his work that pressure groups play a major role in these developments, without
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an explicit statement indicating as such, the reader should not assume this to be the case.
As it stands, Adelman’s work reads as a more traditional account of Radical politics with
an emphasis on the Radicals in Parliament and not those who empowered them.
Pat Thane takes a more direct approach to his assessment of economic reform and
pressure groups in the late Victorian period. Writing of the trade union fight for fair
wages and the Liberal campaign to protect the free trade system, he shows a more direct
link between pressure groups as representative of popular opinion and actions taken by
the government.289 Through his writing Thane shows the value of organized pressure in
advocating for government action. Writing in the same collection of essays, John
Shepherd echoes the sentiments of Thane, going so far as to argue that the TUC was
responsible for the formation of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC). He shows
the TUC organizing campaigns to take the initiative on industrial matters before
Parliament and collaborating with the newly-formed LRC on measures like
unemployment and old age pensions, and campaigns against the 1902 Education Bill and
Chamberlain’s tariff reform programme. As Shepherd sees it, the growing rapprochement
of the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC and Liberal politicians led to a period of
strong Liberal politics in the early twentieth century. 290 This claim from Shepherd is a
strong one in favor of economic pressure groups being incredibly influential over the
government in the late-Victorians and Edwardian periods.
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In perhaps the greatest work on the impact of economic pressure groups in the
late-Victorian period E.H.H. Green discusses Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign at
considerable length. In his work Green shows an undeniable link between economic
pressure groups and the campaign for tariff reform. When discussing the support that
Chamberlain had for tariff reform, Green quotes J.L. Harvin’s Imperial Reciprocity, in
which Harvin proclaims ‘1846 is not 1903’. Green explains that this means that the issues
raised by the 1903 tariff campaign are completely different from those surrounding the
debate over the Corn Law repeal in the 1840s. While the 1846 Corn Law debate had been
primarily a question of Free Trade or Protectionism, Chamberlain’s tariff reform
campaign brought a new set of questions to the fore.291
Green goes on to explain that Chamberlain, supported by the Tariff Reform
League, appealed to British agricultural interests to back his tariff reform program. This
shows that by the early twentieth century politicians could use their ability to appeal to
public opinion as another tool to encourage the passage of legislation in Parliament, as
Chamberlain tries to do through the Tariff Reform League’s attempt to appeal to
agricultural interests, which had long been the leading economic power in Britain.
These economic pressure groups had significant success in pressuring the
government to action on causes that were important to them. This can be seen first
through the inclusion of the local option in temperance legislation. This local option
would allow for locally elected boards in each constituency to determine whether alcohol
would be sold in that locality, and the manner in which it would be sold.292 Temperance
legislation was initially included in the Liberal platform as a way to gain the support of
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‘faddists,’ Nonconformists who tended to favor more radical social reform measures.
These reforms were unpopular with the majority of the Anglican urban-working class,
who viewed the drink as an integral part of their ‘Englishness,’ and of course with those
who sold alcohol. This disdain for temperance reform is evident in speeches made at the
Licensed Victuallers Dinner held in Fishponds Bristol. In these speeches, those taking the
podium decried temperance legislation as robbery of both their livelihood and liberties. In
a speech recorded by The Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, this sentiment is explained by
J.W. Plunkett MP as he remarks “When a man carried on a lawful trade it was unlawful
to rob him of that trade. That was so before the new plan of robbing everybody of
everybody’s rights existed.” In the minds of Plunkett and the other present at this
meeting, the only way to protect the rights and livelihoods of the licensed victuallers and
beer retailers was to include a measure allowing for the local option in any potential drink
bill that may come in the future.
This disdain for temperance legislation was not limited to only one organization
in the suburbs of Bristol. Rather, this was a sentiment that was shared by many publicans
and beer retailers throughout Britain. In the years immediately following the Third
Reform Act meetings were held across the country to discuss the possible implications of
a drink bill. In all of these meetings, the idea of temperance legislation brought about
much consternation from interested parties. The organizations favoring maintenance of
the status-quo regarding temperance pledged to bolster their ranks and do everything
possible to fight the implementation of any drink bill and agreed that at the very least a
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local option measure would be a requirement for any such bill introduced into
Parliament.293
This agitation in favor of the local option influenced the shaping of temperance
legislation. In the years following the Third Reform Act, calls for the local option became
progressively more imperious and difficult for government to ignore.294 This was
evidenced by the indication from Gladstone in 1889 that it was his conviction that any
temperance bill forthcoming from Parliament must of necessity include a local option
measure.295 What this shows is that through the pressure they placed on government to
act in their favor, these interest groups were able to shape legislation. This led to a shift
from stricter temperance bills to more moderate bills dependent on locally elected boards
to control the sale of alcohol. The sheer level of agitation and demonstration against the
notion of temperance legislation also led Parliament to fail to enact any significant
temperance measures, as the United Kingdom Alliance lamented in their 1894 annual
report.296
The influence of economic pressure groups can further be seen through their
efforts to curtail foreign immigration into Britain in the late Victorian period. Although
there were some who felt that the influx of foreign workers was unproblematic, the
opinion of many among the urban working-class was that these aliens were lowering the
average wages of workers in Britain by accepting work at lower wages than native British
workers were willing to do.297 This sentiment was expressed in the annual meeting of
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organized labor delegates in Glasgow when the President of that assembly, a Mr. Hodge,
expressed his belief that:
the door must be shut against the enormous immigration of destitute aliens
into this country. Foreigners driven out of their own country fled here. They
took work at any price – poverty-stricken themselves, they brought poverty to
others.298

This same sentiment was echoed almost verbatim across the United Kingdom, indicating
that the desire to curb immigration was widespread, at least among the urban workingclasses.299
Ultimately, the sentiment against immigrant workers and the efforts of economic
pressure groups in urging the government to pass measures to protect British labor
resulted in the introduction of an Alien Immigration Bill into Parliament by Mr.
Ritchie.300 This bill served two purposes: first to curtail the influx of immigrant labor into
Britain, especially London, and second to endear the Conservative party to the urban
working-class, as many Liberal party MPs said they would not support the bill.
The second method of measuring the influence of economic pressure groups can
be done by examining the immigration issue as well. The Conservative Prime Minister of
the time, Lord Salisbury, speaks directly about the importance of implementing
immigration measures to shore up Conservative party support amongst the working class
in an interview with Mr. White. According to Lord Salisbury, “I am very anxious to pass
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an Alien Immigration Bill and I believe that it would be valuable and much demanded by
the working classes in many districts.”301
Although this bill was ultimately not successful, the fact that Lord Salisbury spoke on it
so candidly, especially with regards to its benefits for the working classes shows that it
was important for politicians to vocally support causes supported by public opinion, as
evidenced through interest groups. On the opposite side of this support was the failure of
H.H. Asquith and Henry Campbell-Bannerman to support a second Alien Immigration
Bill in the early twentieth century. Their failure to support measures called for by public
opinion was one of the main causes for the continued electoral woes of the Liberal party
in the twentieth century prior to 1906.302
This importance for politicians to speak directly to their constituencies about
measures that affected them was further seen through Chamberlain’s campaign for tariff
reform. During this campaign Chamberlain traveled across Britain speaking to audiences
urging support of his plan for tariff reform and imperial preference. Beginning in
September 1903 in Glasgow, Chamberlain engaged in a nationwide propaganda
campaign with stops in Newcastle, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, and other major
industrial centers supported by the Imperial Tariff League, which sought to bring tariff
reform to fruition.303 This speaking tour was further accompanied by a call for new
subscribers to the Tariff Reform League. Specifically, Chamberlain and the Duke of
Sutherland were looking for one thousand new supporters, each willing to contribute
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£100 to the League’s coffers to support the distribution of ‘millions of pamphlets’
through League offices throughout the country.304 Such a dedicated propaganda
campaign and speaking tour shows the importance of speaking directly to the currents of
public opinion. The supporters of tariff reform also make an effort to combat the
assumptions of their opponents, as evidenced by a letter from Sir Herbert Maxwell, MP
published in The Aberdeen Journal. In his letter, composed as a response to a
correspondent questioning the wisdom of tariff reform, Maxwell states:
Dear sir, -- In reply to your first question, I can only say that I have every
confidence in Mr Chamberlain’s assurance that he will be no party to any
scheme which is likely to increase the cost of food generally. He has pointed
out in Glasgow the outlines of a tariff which, if it should slightly raise the
price of wheat and corn (which it is far from certain that it would) would
diminish the price of other food stuffs of universal consumption, such as tea,
coffee, cocoa, etc. I so not share Sir Edward Grey’s fears that preferential
trading would diminish the wages of agricultural labourers in this country,
nor can I understand the source from which those fears arise. Opponents of
tariff reform cannot have it both ways. Either the taxation of of foreign
foodstuffs will raise the price in this country, in which case there will be
more remunerative employment upon the land, or it will leave the price
unchanged, in which case farm labourers will continue to receive better value
for their labour than that class have ever received until recent years.305

The extent to which Chamberlain and his supporters go to appeal to the working-classes
through their assurances that tariff reform will not cause an increase in food costs but will
instead improve their quality of life demonstrates the importance of appealing to public
opinion, especially of the working-classes, in the years following the Third Reform Act.
To conclude, economic interest groups had a considerable impact on political
activity in the years following the Third Reform Act. The enfranchisement of the rural
working-classes and the general redistribution of seats in Parliament created a more
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democratic political system in which public opinion was more influential than had
previously been the case. As such, interest groups became an important tool in the
shaping of policy by holding government accountable for implementing measures that the
electorate wanted. This can be seen through the introduction of a local option measure to
discussions of temperance and the introduction of bills to curtail foreign immigration and
protect British workers. Pressure groups also influenced the way that politicians
interacted with their constituencies, by forcing them to abandon the ‘man over measures’
model of political discourse and instead adopt one in which public opinion was much
more valuable. This is evident in Chamberlain’s 1903 campaign for imperial preference
in which he made a tour of Britain speaking in favor of his measures, supported by the
Tariff Reform League’s pamphlet and propaganda campaign. In this new political
system, which was made possible by the Third Reform Act, political discourse and
interaction became more democratic, with politicians and the public both playing a role in
the creation of policy.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The Third Reform Act dramatically altered the political landscape of late
Victorian Britain. The Act doubled the size of the electorate by extending the 1867
franchise reform into the boroughs and redistributed parliamentary seats by breaking up
old multi-seat constituencies and introducing new single-member districts. The result of
these measures was to create a political system which was more democratic than had
been the case under the 1832 or 1867 Reform Acts. The division of previously multimember constituencies into single-member constituencies allowed for more concise
electoral battles between Liberals and Conservatives, as well as inter-party conflicts. The
increased electorate and redistributed parliamentary seats of the Third Reform Act
bolstered political activity and organization across all classes, and saw public opinion
play a greatly enhanced role in electoral politics in the late-Victorian and Edwardian
periods.
The effects of the Third Reform Act were widespread and felt throughout a wide
spectrum of late Victorian politics. Both the Liberal and Conservative parties were
affected by the altered political landscape, as the redistribution of seats created a system
in which elections were more closely contested by both parties and appeals to public
opinion became necessary to win elections. The Liberal party was unable to effectively
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adapt to this new landscape, and as such was relegated to electoral irrelevance in the two
decades following the Third Reform Act. The Conservative party on the other hand
embraced the increased political activity and organization that came with franchise
expansion and seat redistribution and saw twenty years of political domination.
The Third Reform Act also affected the Irish Home Rule movement. Gladstone’s
need to maintain Liberal power led him to endorse Home Rule openly in the years
following the Third Reform Act in an attempt to create a coalition with the Parnellite
Irish Nationalists. However, this move had the opposite result, and led to many Liberal
MPs deserting the party over their refusal to support the Home Rule measure suggested
by Gladstone. This ideological refusal to support Irish Home Rule, and the increased
importance of popular opinion in the years following the Third Reform Act led to the
formation of the Liberal Unionists. By jumping from the Liberal party ship to that of the
Liberal Unionists, MPs appealed to their constituencies by advocating for social reform
measures and the maintenance of the British Empire, which was a popular sentiment at
the time.
The Third Reform Act’s impact on pressure groups is also significant in the two
decades following the implementation of the Act. While it is true that pressure groups
existed prior to 1884, it was in the final two decades of the nineteenth century that their
influence was felt to the fullest extent. These pressure groups were an easily recognizable
outlet of public opinion and served to both expand the arena of government and to
increase public participation in government.
In chapter two the Conservative ascendancy, and how it was affected by the Third
Reform Act, was discussed at length. In the 1886 election the Conservative party won a
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landslide victory against the Liberal party and ushered in a twenty-year period of
Conservative party hegemony. The changes in the political landscape brought about by
the Third Reform Act created the need for an advanced political organization and more
active efforts to persuade the working-classes to support the Conservative party. This was
done by a concerted effort on the part of Conservative party organization to appeal to
new constituencies while maintaining their support from the traditional power bases. The
middle-class remained a stronghold of Conservative party power because of Conservative
party efforts to present themselves as the defenders of property. This helped bring urban
industrialists into the conservative fold, as they viewed the Conservative party as being
most likely to protect their interests. The working-class was incorporated into the
Conservative party following the implementation of the Third Reform Act because of an
active Conservative party effort to appeal to the new voters. This was accomplished
through associating the Conservative party with aspects of urban working-class culture
such as leisure and the drink. This is seen through the establishment of Conservative
party social clubs. The Leamington Spa Courier and Warwickshire Standard reported
that in the years immediately following the Third Reform Act, Conservative organization
had been extended extensively towards the middle and working-classes.306 The
Conservative party also defended the status quo of the Anglican Church, as the workingclass was wooed by stability. The stability was also emphasized by appealing to the selfinterest of the working-class. By presenting itself as the defender of the British Empire,
the Conservative party was able to portray an image of a party concerned with protecting
British industrial interests, which in turn meant that industrial workers would be able to

“Benefits of a Provident Organization,” Leamington Spa Courier and Warwickshire Standard, 7 August
1886.
306

97

enjoy regular employment and competitive wages. Thus, the Conservative ascendancy of
1886-1906 was not merely a passive benefit of the disintegration of the Liberal party due
to its own ineptitude. Instead, a more nuanced view of the Conservative ascendancy is
required. One in which the split of the Liberal party and its ineptitude in appealing to its
electoral base provided a passive benefit upon which the Conservative Party made an
active effort to build a base of support and solidify their electoral relevance.
Chapter three analyzed the role of the Third Reform Act in the disintegration and
split of the Liberal party. This disintegration was caused by several factors, not least of
which was Gladstone’s support for Irish Home Rule. This move was unpalatable to many
in the party, and directly led to the formation of the Liberal Unionist party as many
Liberal, including Joseph Chamberlain and George Goschen. However, even before this
final split the Liberal party had been in decline. This decline was evident following the
1885 general election, which left them dependent on the Parnellites to maintain their
control over government. This election, and the 1886 election which saw them lose
power and much of their prestige, were indicative of the Liberal party problem in the era
of the Third Reform Act. The party was unable to appeal to effectively organize or appeal
to public opinion in a way that persuaded voters to prefer Liberal candidates. As such,
working-class conservatism played a significant role in the Conservative party’s success
in the late-Victorian period.307 To gain the support of those working-class voters the
Conservative party deliberately associated themselves with aspects of urban society like
the pub, racing, and football to distinguish themselves from the moral reforming Liberal
party.308 This was done through the founding of political clubs, which put as much
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emphasis on organizing parties and socials as they did on organizing voter registration
drives.309 Doing this ingratiated the Conservative party with the newly enfranchised
urban working-class electorate, while gradually familiarizing them with political
organization and participation. Perhaps the most important aspect of this campaign to
gain the support of the urban working-class was the Conservative party’s defense of the
drink. Working-class identity was closely associated with the pub, and as such their
politics revolved heavily around the ‘beer barrel.’310 While the Liberal party was
dedicated to its ‘crusade against sin,’ the Conservative party dedicated itself to defense of
drink and popular sport, elements which were vital to the identity of the urban workingclass.311
Chapter four explored the impact of the Third Reform Act on the Irish Home Rule
Crisis. The Third Reform Act created a political system in which political parties were
more dependent on effective organization for electoral success. As a result of the
redistribution of seats in parliament and the extension of the franchise, this meant that the
Irish MPs held the balance of power in Parliament. Irish Home Rule was thrust to the fore
of British politics by these political machines, which leveraged popular democratic
sentiment, especially in Ireland, for the creation of Home Rule measures. The importance
of this development is two-fold. First, it saw the evolution of British politics from a game
of “man over measures” in which MPs were elected based on their personal integrity to a
system in which candidates had to pay more attention to the opinions of their people.
Second, the development of the caucus finally gave rank-and-file party members an
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opportunity to shape party policy rather than accept the party line dictated to them by the
party elites. Although the NLF initially followed Gladstone’s policy religiously, by the
1890s it was in a position to dictate party policy. These developments were in line with
the longstanding ideals of popular democracy that were responsible for the passage of the
Third Reform Act.
Chapter five looked at the interconnectedness of the Third Reform Act and
socioeconomic pressure groups in the final decades of the nineteenth century. The
ratification of the Third Reform Act had significant impacts on social and political
pressure groups in the closing decades of the Victorian era. During these years pressure
groups were able to exert much more influence in government and bring attention to and
action for their causes in Parliament. This has been seen through Chamberlain’s adoption
of policies advocated by the Liberation Society and National Education League in his
Radical Programme. In the years before the Third Reform Act, politicians did not have to
show as much consideration for the will of the people, as expressed through pressure
groups. However, in a system in which only one member was returned from each
constituency, it became much more pressing to adhere to the wishes of the voters. This
resulted in a system in which pressure groups were able to exert more influence in the
shaping of policy.
The Third Reform Act also created a system in which those wishing to represent
the people in Parliament had to speak directly to the wishes of the majority. This had
previously not been the case, as men wishing to stand for election tended to instead extoll
their own virtues. After the franchise expansion and seat redistribution of 1884-5 this
system was no longer electorally viable. Again, with each constituency only returning
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one member it was vital that those wishing to be elected appeal to popular opinion. Thus,
candidates spoke more openly on political issues, and associated themselves and their
parties with those issues.
Chapter six discussed the role that economic pressure groups played in the years
following the implementation of the Third Reform Act. The enfranchisement of the rural
working-classes and the general redistribution of seats in Parliament created a more
democratic political system in which public opinion was more influential than had
previously been the case. As such, interest groups became an important tool in the
shaping of policy by holding government accountable for implementing measures that the
electorate wanted. This can be seen through the introduction of a local option measure to
discussions of temperance and the introduction of bills to curtail foreign immigration and
protect British workers. Pressure groups also influenced the way that politicians
interacted with their constituencies, by forcing them to abandon the ‘man over measures’
model of political discourse and instead adopt one in which public opinion was much
more valuable. This is evident in Chamberlain’s 1903 campaign for imperial preference
in which he made a tour of Britain speaking in favor of his measures, supported by the
Tariff Reform League’s pamphlet and propaganda campaign. In this new political
system, which was made possible by the Third Reform Act, political discourse and
interaction became more democratic, with politicians and the public both playing a role in
the creation of policy.
Ultimately, the Third Reform Act created a political system in Britain that was
more democratic than had been the case after either the 1832 or 1867 Reform Acts. While
it is accurate to argue that true democracy did not come about until the interwar period,
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the impacts of the Third Reform Act must not be overlooked. The division of previously
multi-member constituencies into single-member constituencies allowed for more concise
electoral battles between Liberals and Conservatives, as well as inter-party conflicts. The
increased electorate and redistributed parliamentary seats of the Third Reform Act
bolstered political activity and organization across all classes, and saw public opinion
play a greatly enhanced role in electoral politics in the late-Victorian and Edwardian
periods. Thus, the years following the Third Reform Act were more democratic than
those preceding it. This more democratic system created a Conservative ascendancy,
which saw the Conservative party take power following the 1886 general election and
remain in power for the next generation.

102

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
BOOKS
The Case for Disestablishment: A Handbook of Facts and Arguments in Support of the
Claim for Religious Equality. London: Society for the Liberation of Religion
from State-patronage and Control, 1894.
This book is a handbook that was designed to instruct temperance campaigners in
the arguments to make when questioned about their support for temperance
legislation. In this book are religious arguments claiming that alcohol is
deteriorating the moral fabric of British society. This book was useful to my
research into the effects of Nonconformists and pressure groups on Liberal party
policy in the late nineteenth century.
LEGISLATION
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. House of Commons. The
Representation of the People Act, 1884, Oxford University.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. House of Commons. The
Redistribution of Seats Act 1885, Oxford University.
NEWSPAPERS
Aberdeen Weekly Journal
Birmingham Daily Post
Birmingham Daily Post
Cambridge Independent Press
Daily News
Derby Daily Telegraph
Edinburgh Evening News
Freeman’s Journal and Daily Commercial Advertiser
Glasgow Herald
Grantham Journal

103

Ipswich Journal
Leamington Spa Courier and Warwickshire Standard
Liverpool Mercury
Liverpool Mercury etc.
Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper
Northern Echo
Reynold’s Newspaper
The Aberdeen Journal
The Belfast News-Letter
The Bristol Mercury and Daily Post
The Courier and Argus
The Derby Daily Telegraph
The Evening Telegraph
The Leeds Mercury
The London Dispatch and People’s Political and Social Reformer
The Northern Liberator
The Northern Star and Leeds General Advertiser
The Nottingham Evening Post
The Pall Mall Gazette
The Preston Guardian
Western Mail

104

SECONDARY SOURCES
BOOKS
Adelman, Paul. Victorian Radicalism: The Middle-Class Experience 1830-1914. New
York: Longman, 1984.
Adelman’s work is a survey of middle-class radicalism from the beginning of the
Victorian era up to the beginning of the First World War. This work discusses
many of the interest groups and reform campaigns covered in this thesis, most
notably the temperance and disestablishment campaigns.
Barker, Michael. Gladstone and Radicalism: The Reconstruction of Liberal Policy in
Britain, 1885-1894. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1975.
In this work Barker discusses and analyzes Liberal party policy under Gladstone
at the end of the nineteenth century. Barker discusses Liberal party policy and
Gladstone’s motivation for committing the Liberal party to these policies. Of
particular importance to this paper was Barker’s treatment of Gladstone and the
Irish Home Rule movement.
Biagini, Eugenio F. British Democracy and Irish Nationalism, 1876-1906.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
This book is beneficial for the understanding of how Irish Nationalism and the
Home Rule Crisis impacted democratic politics in late-Victorian Britain. By using
a “politics from below” approach, Biagini is able to give insight into popular
politics and how politicians interacted with their constituencies. This allows for a
discussion of Conservative efforts to become electorally relevant, and of the
Liberal decline in the late 1880s.
Clark, Samuel and James S. Donnelly, Jr. Irish Peasants: Violence and Political
Unrest, 1780-1914. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.
Clark and Donnelly’s work explores the role of the Irish working-class in political
unrest throughout the entirety of the nineteenth century. While the scope of this
work was wider than the scope of my thesis, this work was useful for the chapters
on Irish Home Rule in the late nineteenth century.
Coffey, John. “Democracy and Popular Religion: Moody and Sankey’s Mission to
Britain. 1873-1875,” in Citizenship and Community: Liberals, Radicals and
Collective Identities in the British Isles 1865-1931, ed. Eugenio F. Biagini, 93119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
This chapter discusses the impact of religious revivalism on British politics in the
Victorian period. Coffey argues that the growth of Nonconformity in Britain
following the wave of revivalism was responsible for the path of Liberal party
policy, as the Nonconformists were a stronghold of Liberal support.

105

Cunningham, Hugh. The Challenge of Democracy: Britain 1832-1918. Harlow:
Longman, 2001.
In this book Cunningham provided an exploration of the political reforms from
the Great Reform to the outbreak of the First World War in terms of how those
reforms took Britain towards true democracy. Cunningham shows that democracy
did not have an accepted definition during this time and was spoken of with both
disdain and acclaim. This work explores the effects of political reform and
democracy on the interconnected roles of the government and the people.
Gange, David. The Victorians. London: OneWorld Publications, 2016.
Gange’s work is a general introduction to the Victorian period. His work provided
a basic framework of understanding upon which was place the work of other
historians to add breadth to my understanding of the Third Reform Act.
Green, E. H. H. The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of
the British Conservative Party, 1880-1914. London: Routledge, 1995.
A view of Conservative decline during the period 1880-1914 framed through
Chamberlain’s insistence on the tariff reform campaign. Provides a narrative of
Conservative high politics. This book serves as a counter to the narratives of
popular Conservatism in the late-Victorian period and serves as an
historiographical counterpoint to my thesis. This book contends that despite
Conservatives governing during this period, the party was in decline rather than in
ascendancy.
Harrison, Brian Howard. Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in
England, 1815-1872. 2nd ed. Staffordshire: Keele University Press, 1994.
Harrison’s work discusses the relationship between the British people and
alcoholic drinks. In this book he explores both sides of the temperance issue: the
religious reformers who wanted to control alcohol and the publicans and workingclass men who fought to maintain their rights to sell and consume alcohol. This
was useful both for my research into the Liberal party collapse and the effects of
pressure groups.
Hollis, Patricia, ed. Pressure from Without in Early Victorian Britain. London:
Edward Arnold Ltd., 1974.
This collection, edited by Patricia Hollis provides analysis and exploration of
pressure groups in the early Victorian period. This work was useful to my
research as it provided an overview of political pressure groups and their
methodology in the mid-nineteenth century. The chapter of Chartism was
especially useful because it showed the early failures of pressure groups against
which I set their later successes.
Lang, Sean. Parliamentary Reform 1785-1928. Abingdon: Routledge, 1993.

106

This work is a wide survey of parliamentary history and reform from 1785 until
the full enfranchisement of women in the 1920s. Lang offers analysis of each
major reform and the governmental and public response to calls for these reforms.
Lang’s work was useful for both discussing public opinion and the differences in
the political landscape following the Third Reform Act.
Lawrence, Jon. Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth
to Blair. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Lawrence’s work provides analysis of the interactions between the government
and the people, and the people’s role in electing their own leaders. This book is a
narrative history exploring the role of public opinion up to the twentieth century.
However, Lawrence’s work in discussing the electoral conditions around 1867
and 1885 were helpful in my research to analyze how the Third Reform Act
changed British political participation.
Lawrence, Jon. Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in
England, 1867-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Like Biagini’s British Democracy and Irish Nationalism, Lawrence uses a
“politics from below” approach to government in Britain. This book uses
statistical analysis to combat common assumptions about popular politics during
the period and embraces the linguistic turn approach to interpreting how the
constituencies interacted with their MPs. This work is useful to the discussion of
popular Conservatism, especially among the urban working class.
Lee, Stephen J. Aspects of British Political History 1815-1914. London: Routledge,
1994.
A general treatment of the major political issues of nineteenth century Britain.
Provides useful background discussion of the conditions surrounding the
Conservative ascendancy, such as Home Rule and the Third Reform Act.
McCaffrey, Lawrence J. The Irish Question: Two Centuries of Conflict. 2nd ed.,
Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015.
McCaffrey provides a narrative of the struggle between Britain and Ireland from
Ireland’s incorporation into the United Kingdom in 1800 to the establishment of
the Irish Free State. McCaffrey discusses the impacts of Irish nationalism on the
Irish Question, and the effects of the Irish Question on British politics and empire.
This work was useful to my research for the Irish Home Rule crisis and the
breakup of the Liberal party.
McWilliam, Rohan. Popular Politics in Nineteenth Century England. London:
Routledge, 1998.
McWilliam provides an introduction to the major policy and ideology
developments of the nineteenth century. This work was useful for the

107

historiographical discussion of the Third Reform Act and gives vital insights into
the faddist pressure groups that had become essential to the success of the Liberal
party.
Parry, Jonathan. The Rise and the Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
A general history on Liberal government in the Victorian period. This book will
be useful to my historiography, as it presents Home Rule as the cause for the
Liberal split. Parry’s work is also helpful in showing how the Liberal party was
unable to appeal to some working-class voters because of their insistence of moral
reform.
Pugh, Martin. Britain Since 1789: Concise History. Basingstoke: MacMillan Press,
1999.
Pugh’s work is a general political history of Britain from the French Revolution
through the leadership of Tony Blair in the late twentieth century. This work has
been useful as a reference for major political developments throughout the
Victorian era, especially the political reforms of 1867 and 1884.
Roberts, B. C. The Trades Union Congress, 1868-1921. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1958.
Roberts’s work is a history of the Trades Union Congress from the Second
Reform Act until just after the First World War. The Trades Union Congress
(TUC) was the largest labor union in Britain at the time, and as such was also the
largest interest group. This work was useful to my research because it gave me
valuable insight into how economic interest groups petitioned government in the
years following the Third Reform Act.
Saunders, Robert. Democracy and the Vote in British Politics 1848-1867: The Making
of the Second Reform Act. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.
Saunders’s work analyzed the Second Reform Act and the role that democracy
played in the implementation of that reform. This work was useful to my research
as it provided both a narrative for the Second Reform Act, which formed the
political system altered by the Third Reform Act, and by establishing an argument
that public opinion became more important as more citizens were given the
franchise.
Shepherd, John. “Labour and Parliament: The Lib-Labs as the first Working-class
MPs, 1885-1906.” in Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised
Labour and Party Politics, ed. Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
While this work did not play a large role in my research, it did provide some
insight into working-class politics. As the working-class became a larger portion
of the British electorate, Shepherd argued that the Liberal-Labour alliance played

108

an important role in ensuring representation for the working class and served as a
forerunner to the Labour party.
Thane, Pat “Labour and Local Politics: Radicalism, Democracy, and Social Reform
1880-1914.” in Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour
and Party Politics, ed. Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Thane’s work shows the importance of local politics and party organization to the
major political parties in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods. In this chapter,
Thane discussed the role of democracy and public opinion in social reform.
Tholfsen, Trygve. Working Class Radicalism in Mid-Victorian England. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977.
Tolfsen’s work provides a narrative of political radicalism amongst the workingclasses in Victorian Britain. While this work is a valuable overview of workingclass radicalism, it was especially useful for my purposes as Tholfsen gives
insights on the effects of working-class considerations on the Irish Home Rule
question.
Thompson, Andrew S. Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932.
New York: Routledge, 2014.
Thompson provides an overview of the role the British Empire played in politics
in the late Victorian period into the twentieth century. Thompson spent
considerable effort discussing the role of the Boer War on British politics, and he
argues that a more nuanced approach than the status quo is necessary. According
to Thompson the anti-imperialist movement did not gain much momentum from
the Boer War, as had previously been thought.
Wright, D. G. Popular Radicalism: The Working-Class Experience 1780-1880.
London: Longman, 1988.
Wright’s work is an overview of the working-class role in radical politics for most
of the nineteenth century. Although Wright’s narrative ends before the period
discussed in my thesis, his work is useful for my analysis of public opinion and
the role of working-class activism in the Liberal party before the Third Reform
Act.

JOURNALS
Aidt, Toke S., and Raphaël Franck. "Democratization Under the Threat of
Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832." Econometrica 83,
no. 2 (2015): 505-47.

109

This work examines the link between parliamentary reform and the risk of
political revolution in 1830s Britain. An empirical analysis of the riots that
occurred near British constituencies showed that British voters were persuaded to
vote for pro-reform politicians after seeing the violence of the Swing Riots
firsthand. This article is useful for placing the process of democratization within a
broader context of the nineteenth century.
Belcher, Jason. "Gladstonian Liberalism: A Catalyst for Social Representation and
Democratic Reform in Victorian Britain" (2018). Electronic Thesis
Collection. 244.
Belcher’s thesis discusses Gladstone’s legacy and achievements as leader of
Parliament and the treatment he has received by subsequent historians. Belcher
argues that Gladstone should not be considered a democratic revolutionary, but
that he did implement some elements of democratic change in his reforms.
Belcher’s analysis of Gladstone was useful to my research into Gladstone’s
motivations for supporting Irish Home Rule in the 1880s.
Blaxill, Luke. “Electioneering, the Third Reform Act, and Political Change in the
1880s,” Parliamentary History 30, no 3. (2011): 343-373.
This article uses the borough of Ipswich as a focus to discuss the changes in the
process of electioneering in the year immediately following the Third Reform
Act. Blaxill argues that historians have underestimated the extent to which the
Third Reform Act transformed the political culture. He further argues that the
Third Reform Act had the unintended consequence of nationalizing politics.
Chadwick, Mary. “The Role of Redistribution in the Making of the Third Reform
Act,” The Historical Journal 19, no. 3 (1976): 665-683.
In this article Mary Chadwick argues that the Third Reform Act was the most
significant of the three franchise reform acts during the nineteenth century,
despite receiving the least attention from historians. In her work, Chadwick
argues that what sets the Third Reform Act apart from the other two acts was its
focus on redistribution.
Clayton, Huw. “How Not to Run a Campaign: The Failure of the Unionist Free
Traders, 1903-6,” Parliamentary History 30, no. 2 (2011): 158-174.
Clayton’s article provides an analysis of the failure of Chamberlain’s tariff reform
campaign in the early twentieth century. This tariff reform campaign was
designed to implement a system of imperial preference, which went against the
status quo of free trade. Clayton’s article argues that the Liberal Unionists failed
to understand mass politics, and as such the tariff reform campaign failed and the
Liberal Unionists lost seats in the 1906 election.

110

Ertman, Thomas. “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,”
Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 8-9 (2010): 1000-1022.
This article focuses on the period of political change around the First Reform Act.
This period began with Catholic Emancipation, but eventually culminated in
political reform for the entirety of Britain. Ertman argues that this period had a
threefold impact on the political order by removing executive control of the
legislative, brought a two-party system, and served as a catalyst for future
reforms.
Fraser, P. "The Liberal Unionist Alliance: Chamberlain, Hartington, and the
Conservatives, 1886-1904," The English Historical Review 77, no. 302 (1962):
53-78.
An account of the Liberal Unionist party and Chamberlain’s transition from
Liberal, to Liberal Unionist, to Conservative. Gives context into the shifting
ideological bases of the two parties following the Third Reform Act. This article
shows how Conservative efforts to reform convinced Chamberlain and other
Liberal leaders that the Conservative party was better upholding principles of
liberalism.
Hamer, D. A. "The Irish Question and Liberal Politics, 1886-1894," The Historical
Journal 12, no. 3 (1969): 511-32.
This article gives an overview of the Irish Home Rule question in the final two
decades of the nineteenth century. Hamer argues that the Irish Question occupied
a place of political predominance in the closing decades of the Victorian period.
Hamer gives valuable insight into the importance of Irish Home Rule to
Gladstone and to the Liberal party.
Kelly, Matthew. “Home Rule for Ireland: For and Against,” The Historian 124
(Winter 201/2015): 30-36.
Kelly’s work provides an introductory overview of the major arguments both for
and against Irish Home Rule and discusses the groups who supported both sides.
This work was useful for setting my argument and gaining a basic understanding
of the main sides of the Irish Question
Kneale, James. “The Place of Drink: Temperance and the Public, 1856-1914,” Social
& Cultural Geography 2, no. 1 (2001): 43-59.
In his treatment of temperance in Britain during the Victorian period, Kneale
argues that rather than continuing their efforts at reforming individuals the United
Kingdom Alliance instead shifted their efforts towards outright banning alcohol.
This wider scope of activity for a faddist pressure group is used to show the
effects of the Third Reform Act.

111

Lawrence, Jon. "Class and Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism, 18801914," The English Historical Review 108, no. 428 (1993): 629-652.
An exploration of the role that social class and gender played in popular
Conservatism in the late-Victorian period. This article, like Lawrence’s other
work, provides an account of politics from below. This article is useful in the
historiographical discussion of the Conservative ascendance, as it suggests that
Conservatives regained power through their own efforts.
Lubenow, W. C. "Irish Home Rule and the Social Basis of the Great Separation in
the Liberal Party in 1886," The Historical Journal 28, no. 1 (1985): 125-142.
An account of the Liberal split in 1886. Lubenow contends that it was political
reasons rather than social reasons that led to the Liberal split. This article is useful
to my research as the Conservative ascendancy begins in part with the Home Rule
Crisis. Lubenow claims that it was easier for Liberals to defect as the two parties
had become ideologically closer.
McConnel, James. "'Jobbing with Tory and Liberal': Irish Nationalists and the
Politics of Patronage 1880-1914," Past & Present 188, no. 1 (2005): 105-131.
This article gives insight into how patronage played a role in the Irish National
party in the late-Victorian period. This article was not particularly useful to my
research once I switched topics but does give insight into the prominence that
patronage played in gaining political relevance. This article could also be used to
explain why the Irish Nationalists were in a coalition with the Conservative party
for a short period.
McEwen, John M. "The Liberal Party and the Irish Question during the First
World War," Journal of British Studies 12, no. 1 (1972): 109-31.
In this article John McEwen asks a simple question, but one which he argues has
not been given as much attention as it merits: How many nails did Ireland put in
the Liberal coffin between 1914 and 1918? McEwen argues that Home Rule was
a unifying force for the Liberal party at the outbreak of the war, but Ireland’s
growing separatism made the prospect harder to cling to and made the Liberal
more unpopular.
Porritt, Annie G. "The Irish Home Rule Bill," Political Science Quarterly 28, no. 2
(1913): 298-319.
A near contemporary account of the Irish Home Rule movement. This article is
useful to my research because it gives insight into the social conflict theory of
Liberal decline and serves as a counter to my thesis. This fits into the

112

historiographical picture I am presenting, in that contemporaries ascribed to the
belief that Conservatives came to power because of a Liberal collapse.
Roberts, Matthew. "Popular Conservatism in Britain, 1832-1914," Parliamentary
History 26, no. 3 (2007): 387-410.
This article is vital to my understanding of popular Conservatism in Britain. Much
of my argument was inspired by Roberts’ ideas and this article forms the
backbone of my thesis. It provides an overview of Conservative efforts to appeal
to the electorate as it expands and allows for other research to be used to support
its main arguments.
Roberts, Matthew. "'Villa Toryism' and Popular Conservatism in Leeds, 18851902," The Historical Journal 49, no. 1 (2006): 217-246.
This article is a localized account of popular or ‘Villa’ Toryism in the late
Victorian period. This article is key to my arguments that the Conservatives make
active efforts to solidify their support among the middle class. It shows how the
Conservative party placed themselves in position to be the advocates for industry
and property.
Rodden, John. “Neither Popes nor Potatoes: The Irish Question and the Marxist
Answer,” The Midwest Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2009): 232-254.
Rodden’s article asserts that both Marx and Engels spent considerable debating
the Irish Question and believed that an industrialized Ireland could be a vital force
in their socialist revolution. However, Marx ultimately lacked a real answer for
Ireland. Rodden argues that this topic has been largely overlooked by other
historians and claims that Marx’s assertion that the Irish Question was a matter of
haves vs. have nots needs more attention.
Stanbridge, Karen. “Nationalism, International Factors and the ‘Irish Question’ in
the Era of the First World War,” Nations and Nationalism 11 no. 1 (2005):
21-42.
In this article Stanbridge considers the factors that led all players in the Irish
Home Rule crisis to adopt policies that ultimately became irreconcilable. Part of
this analysis is a discussion of nationalism on both the British and Irish sides, but
the discussion of Irish nationalism and the effect it had on calls for Home Rule
were especially useful to my research.
Stephens, Hugh W. "The Changing Context of British Politics in the 1880s: The
Reform Acts and the Formation of the Liberal Unionist Party," Social
Science History 1, no. 4 (1977): 486-501.

113

This article gives a narrative of the formation of the Liberal Unionist party. This
is a subject that Stephens claims has not been given much attention from
historians. This article is useful to the historiographical discussion of the Liberal
Unionist party and the Third Reform Act because Stephens believes that the Third
Reform Act caused the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives to drift together
ideologically. This claim is countered by others such as Biagini and Lawrence.
Vincent, John. "The Effect of the Second Reform Act in Lancashire," The Historical
Journal 11, no. 1 (1968): 84-94.
This article discusses the effects of the Second Reform Act on Lancashire in the
late 1860s. By analyzing the electoral data from 1868, Vincent seeks to ascertain
the impact of the expanded electorate on the Conservative success in that election.
Through analyzing the data, Vincent suggests that the expanded electorate was
not the cause of the Conservative success but was rather previously existing
political issues.

